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This thesis analyzes the corporate merger between the
Babcock & Wilcox Company and J. Ray McDermott & Co., Incor-
porated. The merger, consummated on March 31, 1978, followed
a lengthy bidding war between McDermott and United Technolo-
gies Corporation. The energy crisis, its impact on the
future world economy, and its relationship to the businesses
of Babcock & Wilcox and McDermott are studied. A financial
analysis of B&W and McDermott is then conducted to determine
their financial positions and potential growth. The terms of
the merger, along with its legality are further described and
analyzed. A post merger appraisal was undertaken, including
such aspects as Three Mile Island and McDermott 's "price-
fixing" scandal. The conclusion was that the merger was
successful for McDermott for various reasons; but from B&W's
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A. ENERGY AND WORLD ECONOMY
The world's economy has changed dramatically in the last
decade. There has been a slowing down of the rate of economic
growth, due largely to the sharp increase in the price of
energy since 1973.
In the years 1973-1977 the world experienced an energy
crisis. This crisis was not the result of a global shortage
of energy sources but rather was contingent on four actors:
an increase in global consumption of energy during the 1960 's;
an arbitrary price structure for petroleum and natural gas
which led to increased reliance on these two attractive
sources of energy as opposed to coal and atomic energy; the
peaking out of the United States gas and petroleum production
in 1970-1971: and OPEC's successful exploitation of oil
2prices.
The world today is 90 percent dependent on three forms
of energy; oil, coal and natural guas. A fourth source is
nuclear power, but as of 1978 it comprised only 2 percent of
the world's energy needs. Oil and natural gas have been in
more demand than coal over the past 50 years because of
their ease in storage, handling and shipment. But coal may
have the advantage for the future due to its abundance and
access. The United States, Soviet Union and China have vast
10

resources of coal that have yet to be tapped. So too oil and
natural gas are known to exist in great quantities; but the
3
easy places to look have already been explored. The
uncertainty lies in the lack of knowledge of where these
untapped resources exist, the technologies that bear on
finding and exploring them; and their more efficient use.
As W. W. Rostow remarks, "We have ample fossil fuel reserves,
if supplemented by some expansion of nuclear power from
existing technology, to cover requirements down to about the
1990 's; but the energy base of industrialized civilization
will then have to include increasingly some new energy
source.
"
Energy experts project that from now through the turn
of the century coal, which comprises 80 percent of the world's
fossil fuel reserves, will supply only 22 percent of the
world's energy. In contrast oil and natural gas will com-
prise some 67 percent; while they only constitute seven
percent of known reserves. 5
Sources of energy for the future needed to supplement
fossil fuels, are believed to be solar energy, oil extracted
from shale rock or tar sands and nuclear power. The con-
clusions made are that oil and natural gas will run down
over the next century, with coal remaining for a longer




As stated in the 1977 Annual Report of J. Ray McDermott
& Co., Inc., "... by 1985 coal production is likely to increase
by at least 50 percent in the United States and nuclear
power, here and throughout the developed world, should grow
to three times its 1976 level."
B. BABCOCK & WILCOX AND J. RAY McDERMOTT' S ROLE IN THE
ENERGY FIELD
The preceeding section gave a short synopsis of the
energy problems that the world economy will be looking at in
the future. These problems deal directly with the businesses
of the Babcock & Wilcox Co. (B&W) and J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
Inc. (McDermott) and in the author's opinion indirectly led
to the merger of these two companies.
B&W's main business lies in the manufacture of nuclear
and fossil-fuel generating equipment. These power generation
equipment include coal-fired boilers and nuclear steam systems.
B&W is thus heavily involved in the future energy field.
With continuing emphasis being placed on coal and nuclear
power as a source of future energy, B&W is a world leader
in this field. As a result they were attractive to both
United Technologies Corporation (UTC) and J. Ray McDermott
& Co., Inc. (McDermott) as a potential merger candidate.
McDermott is a leader in the construction of offshore
drilling platforms. While oil and natural gas are available,
in many areas of the world they sometimes lie beneath the
ocean floor in water depths exceeding 1000 feet. Although
12

McDermott has developed equipment to explore at these depths,
the costs of such exploration are very high. In consequence
exploratory drilling has also become more expensive and
riskier to a company.
Since 1976 McDermott' s financial picture has deteriorated
drastically due to reduced sales resulting from problems in
offshore drilling. For this reason they desired, and even-
tually accomplished, a merger with B&W.
C. OBJECTIVES
Because of the tremendously changing economy over the
1970 's, and specifically the energy crisis, companies such
as B&W became major acquisition targets of corporations who
wanted to diversify or expand externally. A leader in the
power generation field, B&W was the acquisition prize of
1978.
With this in mind the author's objective was to look
at this merger and appraise whether or not it was beneficial
for both companies. McDermott 's two main goals for the
acquisition were to (1) diversify to lessen the blow of
their declining marine construction business and (2) avoid
becoming an acquisition target themselves. B&W's objective
was to find the "best corporate parent" in lieu of an
eventual takeover.
The author also looks at the combined companies two
years after the merger and attempts to analyze whether the
13

results of the merger are still in keeping with the indiv-
idual companies' goals. Areas of concern include impending
lawsuits brought against B&W and McDermott, especially those
resulting from the Three Mile Island nuclear incident of




Information for this research effort was obtained from
two primary sources. First, literature searches were con-
ducted to obtain data concerning mergers in general, and
information concerning the details of the merger of B&W and
McDermott, under the search locators of Corporate Mergers
,
Acquisitions and Mergers , Babcock & Wilcox Co . and J. Ray
McDermott & Co., Inc . Additionally a search exclusively of
the New York Times and Wall Street Journal was conducted to
obtain data of the B&W-McDermott merger.
The second source of data was from B&W, McDermott and
United Technologies Corporation's corporate offices. These
included annual reports, news releases and assorted documents
dealing with the merger.
Once these data were obtained mergers in general were
studied to determine the rationale behind such consolidations
B&W and McDermott 's businesses in particular, were then
14

analyzed to appraise the merits from both companies'
standpoints. Conclusions were then drawn based on
qualitative and quantitative final concerns.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARIES
The thesis begins with a brief look at the energy field
and its relation to B&W and McDermott's businesses. Next
mergers and acquisitions are discussed in general. Such
aspects as the motives behind, failings in and legal
implications of mergers follow.
The next three chapters provide a brief background to
the McDermott-B&W merger, the two companies' operations and
finally a trend analysis of each individual company.
Chapters VI and VII presents a description and appraisal
of the merger, respectively. Chapter VIII includes an
analysis of the outcome of the merger from the two companies
standpoints after two years of operation and general
conclusions, taking into account the impact of the nuclear
accident at Three Mile Island on B&W s nuclear business,
McDermott's "price-fixing" scandal and the shakeup within
B&W s corporate structure as a result of the merger.
15

II. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
This chapter discusses mergers and acquisitions in
general. It describes motives for mergers and why some
mergers fail. Finally it addresses various methods of
purchasing a company via merger, and the legal implications
to be considered when attempting one.
A. GENERAL
"The term 'merger' implies a combination of two or more
formerly independent business units into one organization
7
with a common management and ownership." "An 'acquisition,'
on the other hand, concerns one company's purchase of an-
,
other's total or controlling interest, usually in the form
of stock, and the subsequent operation of the purchased
g
company as a separate division or subsidiary."
Both these terms are used interchangeably when talking
about the combination of two companies. Other texts say
that mergers are defined as acquisitions of large companies.
In this thesis the author will use both terms interchangeably
when addressing the acquisition of the Babcock & Wilcox
Company by J. Ray McDermott & Co., Incorporated (McDermott)
.
B. WHY COMPAINES MERGE
Corporations over the decades have grown and expanded
by two basic and distinct means, internally or externally.
16

Internally, a company would improve its product and product
line, lower costs, increase research and development, diver-
sify and gradually increase its sales and profits. Month
after month, year after year they would improve and grow
from within.
In contrast to this is the method of external growth,
the method of increasing sales and profits by the acquisition
of another company's product line. Usually a company which
is growing well internally, will also try to acquire other
companies, although this is not always the case. Top
executives feel that through mergers a company can complement
its internal growth thus enhancing its growth rate overall.
From an economic viewpoint there are basically three different
types of mergers, or business combinations; horizontal, ver-
tical and conglomerate.
Horizontal expansion occurs when two compaines in the
same business combine in order to broaden their capabilities
in the market and often times improve their position within
their competitive market. The chief obstacles to this type
of expansion come from the Federal Trade Commission and
Justice Department's Antitrust Division which may stop the
merger if it is felt that a monopoly would be formed or
would tend to operate in restraint of trade.
Vertical combination occurs when a company combines with
either a supplier or customer. The objectives are economies
17

of scale, better quality control of his outputs and access
to and control over raw materials.
A conglomerate merger exists when two unrelated companies
join together. This is often the case because companies
hope to diversify into other fields of business, especially
ones that have the potential for large economic growth.
A major motive for a company in a static, stagnant or
declining industry is to merge with one in a growing field.
By diversification companies are looking for long term
financial improvement.
There are numerous reasons why a firm would desire to
merge. What companies should look at is whether a merger
is better for them than comparative internal growth
9
alternatives.
The following are some of the motivations for companies
to merge:
1. To save time in building a new product line, new
market area or new research and development team. For
example, synthetic fibers brought into the market a veritable
flood of new products, from nylon stockings to house
insulation.""
2. To increase the growth rate of the company. In past
years some firms have established very attractive earnings
growth rates due to mergers.
3. Diversification into a different industry. Conglom-
erate mergers provide one way of acquiring an entirely
18

different class of assets. In this way a company can
improve its cyclical and seasonal stability by diversifying
into a product to fill its slack periods.
4. To acquire better know-how through different
management. Either because of new technological advances
or a company's inability to acquire new management independ-
ently, a company could merge to gain the expertise of the
acquired company's management.
5. To increase borrowing capacity and to qualify for
certain contracts.
6. To offset a threatened loss of market. Examples
such as the tobacco and steam locomotive companies had to
diversify to cushion threats to their respective markets.
7. To improve a company's market effort by buying
either a supplier or customer. In this way his access to
resources or outlets for his outputs are protected.
8. For tax reasons. In order to purchase a company
with prior tax losses which will offset current or future
earnings.
9. To be economically strong and protect against take-
over maneuvers. This is one of the main reasons for
McDermott's desire to acquire B&W.
10. Synergistic operating economies. This is one of
the most common reasons for mergers. The basic belief is
that one combined company is more efficient than two separate





11. To increase the firm's stock value and owner's
investment in the firm.
These are just some reasons or motivations for which
companies merge. Each company has its own reason for
merging. Often a company does not have any choice but to
merge. Thus, to the extent possible, a company should
examine its best interest and decide whether a merger is
right for them or not. If they are forced to merge they
should analyze which corporation will make the best "parent."
As stated by United Technologies ' Senior Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer, Edward L. Hennessey, Jr., "A good
acquisition policy will incorporate a well-defined procedure
of industry analysis. Important points to check include:
sales and earnings trends, seasonal patterns, secular trends,




C. ACQUISITIONS ARE ON THE MOVE
"What is termed 'the merger movement' refers to the
periodic rise and fall in the number of mergers taking place,
roughly corresponding to cyclical swings of prosperity and
14depression." Since the 1920 's there have been five periods
which experienced large fluctuations in the number of mergers
The first started after World War I and continued until the
early 1920 's. The second started during the economically
prosperous times of the mid-1920 's and ended with the
20

economic crash of 1929. The third started after World War II
and continued through to 1948. The fourth started in 1950
and continued to 1968. The present wave started in 1974 and
is still growing.
One aspect of today's acquisitions is that there seems
to be more "hostile" takeovers than in the past. In this
type merger the acquirer would choose a target select an
appropriate price, and make a surprise tender offer. While
once it was unheard of to attempt to acquire another company
without its consent, today it is becoming commonplace. Also,
the target' companies of today are for the most part a lot
larger than they used to be. Acquisition takovers such as
McDermott's acquisition of B&W, and Kennecott Copper's pur-
chase of Carborundum cost over $500 million, and Unilever
paid $482 million for National Starch. Today, instead
of going to a company's top management and discussing the
possibility of a takeover an acquirer has various alterna-
tive options. One of these methods is to simply go to the
stockholders in order to buy a controlling interest in a
company. These tender offers have, in the years 1978 to
1980, been made at prices averaging anywhere from 25 to 100
percent above the market value of the target stock (in 1978
B&W's was 83.8 percent higher).
As some analysts have stated, it seems that the current
takeover trend is more than just a passing fad. One reason
is the fact that takeovers or mergers generally make economic
21

sense. In today's bidding wars however, it costs the acquir-
ing companies a great deal of money for legal and advisory
fees, compared to years ago, when takeovers were fairly
straightforward operations. Because of this, to the extent
to which it is possible, companies must be sure of all the
legalities concerning the merger and whether or not the
merger is right for its company. Otherwise the merger could
cause more harm than good, and could eventually fail.
D. WHY MERGERS FAIL
Mergers, unlike marriages, are not made in heaven. They
can fail for a variety of different reasons. There are five
deadly defects that occur again and again:
1. Financial considerations alone do not necessarily
provide a good foundation for a successful acquisition.
2. Many mergers fail because of managements'
inexperience in the selection of an acquisition strategy,
the selection of potential candidates, and in the implemen-
tation of the program.
3. A frequent problem is lack of preplanning to
identify the long-term, nonfinancial impacts of the merger
on the parent company.
4. Improper fit of the merged companies is another
problem.
5. Poor communication between the parent and subsidiary
companies once the initial novelty of the merger wears off.
22

As described above, although mergers can be the right
avenue for growth of a company, they are not always the most
productive route. When considering a merger, companies must
move cautiously to avoid the many pitfalls that can occur
along the way.
E. METHODS OF PURCHASE
Corporations are formed and operate under the governing
laws of the federal government and the states in which they
choose to incorporate. In addition, all states have rules
and laws that govern the merging of two companies. Although
each state may have differing merger laws they are all linked
together by three common and basic methods of merging;
purchase of assets, purchase of stock or "statutory" merger
or consolidation.
By purchase of assets, a corporation can buy another
company's assets, but still leave the selling company's
structure intact. By purchase of stock, the acquiring com-
pany goes directly to the shareholders and buys their shares
of stock. Unlike a purchase of assets, a purchase of stock
does not require approval of the acquired company's board of
directors.
The third method is "statutory" merger or consolidation.
By complying with the requirements explicitly set out in a
state
'
s statutory scheme, a merger results by operation of
law. In a merger, one of the joining corporations survives,
23

while the others cease to exist as legal entities. In a
consolidation, all the corporations existing prior to the
act of joining cease to exist as legal entities and a new
corporation is created.
Therefore, although the post merger corporate structure
can be achieved by various different forms, the methods are
not interchangeable. The choice of how they pay the purchase
price is one consideration. Another is the different legal
consequences that can and often times do result from mergers
and the methods used in acquisition.
F. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Mergers and acquisitions today are not as neat and clean
as a decade ago. The regulatory environment that surrounds
acquisition activities is becoming ever more complex. There
are numerous acts and laws in existence that restrict mergers
and acquisitions, especially in the areas of restraint of
trade and hampering of competition.
Since the late 1890' s Congress has passed various laws
to prevent harmful monopolies, and therefore safeguard the
American free enterprise system. Of these laws the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act of 18 90 is the most familiar. Enforced by
the Justice Department's Anti-Trust Division, the Sherman
Act makes it a punishable misdemeanor for the owners, mana-
gers or directors of any firm to monopolize, combine or
conspire with others to monopolize any part of the trade in
24

18interstate commerce or with foreign countries. Over the
years the Supreme Court has had to make numerous decisions
concerning this act. It has been concluded that the Sherman
Act deals with "unreasonable" restraint of trade and only
these restraints are unlawful.
In 1914 two acts were enacted that further defined and
sharpened the Sherman Act of 1890. The Clayton Act defined
certain unreasonable restraints of trade, including some
unfair trade practices of a more localized nature. It
stated that any collusion or merger for the purpose of
controlling sources of supply for any industry is unreason-
able restraint of trade. The second act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, declares that monopolistic competitive methods
in interstate commerce, such as conspiring to fix prices, are
19
unlawful. These two acts are ones that merging companies
must take a good look at prior to entering into any merger
agreement. The Federal Trade Commission continued its en-
forcement of these acts by amending the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act in 1967 to include general policies and
procedures that they will follow when challenging mergers
on the grounds of restraint of trade.
Fifteen years ago the world of hostile takeovers and
mergers was a straight forward operation. But times have
changed, due largely to two pieces of legislation enacted
since 1968. In that year Congress passed the Williams Act.
"It required companies making tender offers to disclose
25

certain basic information, e.g., who they are, the source
20
of their funds, and what they plan to do with the target."
This requirement tended to stop hostile takeovers from hap-
pening before the target company could get its defenses
collected. One pitfall of the act was, however, that sur-
prise offers could still occur. As a result, target companies
lobbied for state laws that they could use as defenses.
During the late 1960 's over 30 states agreed to these laws.
These generally stated that the acquiring company would have
to abide by certain restrictions, if their offer to acquire
a company was rejected. They would also require acquiring
companies to disclose their takeover plans in advance, and
therefore would give the target time to tie up the takeover
offer in court.
More recently, in June 1978, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
was passed. This act stated that "corporations with assets
of $100 million or more must notify the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment thirty days in advance of a contemplated merger with a
company whose assets were $10 million or more. . .providing
that the acquisition involves at least 15 percent of the
21
acquired company's voting securities."
The final law to be discussed deals specifically with
such mergers as that of B&W and McDermott, i.e. those taking
place involving companies in the atomic energy field. This
26

act is the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The one specific
article that applies in the B&W-McDermott merger is Article
184. It states that no license granted under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 and no right to utilize or produce special
nuclear material can be transferred, assigned or disposed of
in any manner without prior written consent by the Atomic
22Energy Commission.
As can be seen, there are many varied laws and statutes
in existence today that puts numerous restraints on mergers,
especially on the acquiring company. This is one good reason
why companies considering mergers in today's financial world
should have lawyers thoroughly familiar with the various laws
and statutes. In this way the likelihood of an unsuccessful
merger attempt can be minimized.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In summary it can be said that mergers are becoming more
commonplace in today's financial society. Merging is an
alternative means of expanding a company's operation, other
than by internal means. The reasons that companies merger
are numerous and varied. So too are the legal obstacles,
that due to their complexity, can result in an unsuccessful




In this chapter the author provides a brief background
of the Babcock & Wilcox Co. - J. Ray McDermott & Co. merger
,
starting with United Technologies' (UTC) initial interest in
B&W, McDermott' s reasons for entering the merger picture,
the subsequent bidding war between McDermott and U.T.C. and
finally with the basis for the terms of the McDermott-B&W
merger.
A. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION'S INITIAL INTEREST
In March 1977, U.T.C. a Connecticut based conglomerate,
announced that it had submitted a proposal to the board of
directors of B&W to purchase any and all shares of the
outstanding common stock of B&W for $42 per share. In comment-
ing on this action, U.T.C. chairman and president, Harry J.
Gray, said: "This proposed acquisition fits the criteria
United Technologies first established in 1973. At that
time we publicly outlined the profile of potential partners
for United; namely, that they be successful, established,
high-technology companies, operating profitably in markets
where they hold leading positions outside the government
sphere. Babcock meets all of United' s established criteria.
A leader in its basic business, it has a high measure of
technology in all of its operations, a competent and aggressive
management in place, and an excellent financial base, with
23
a healthy performance trend."
28

In B&W, U.T.C. was after what industry observers and
analysts agreed was an acquisition prize. While B&W s stock
was then selling at $34 a share on the New York Stock
Exchange, many analysts were looking at the growth potential
of its coal and nuclear-power plants equipment. An offer
of $42 a share seemed cheap. As one analyst stated, "about
24$50 a share would be more like it." B&W's financial figures
since 1973 had been impressive in the eyes of U.T.C.'s Harry
Gray. Earnings had doubled in four years to a record $53.1
million, or $4.57 per share. B&W obtained much of that in-
crease by simply freeing itself from profit-draining, fixed
price contracts with the utility companies it supplied. This
plus increased sales of boilers, nuclear-steam systems, fans
and other equipment made B&W an attractive catch.
U.T.C. was interested in acquiring B&W rather than Com-
bustion Engineering, a competitor of B&W's in both nuclear
and boiler equipment sales, because it would be cheaper, and
B&W was thought to be in a better position to pick up new
25
orders when utility orders picked up in a few years. Says
Paul Hellingby, Jr., chairman of the investment house White,
Weld & Co., "we liked the vertical integration of B&W in
steam generation and were not attracted to Combustion's
businesses outside the power generation field, such as its





Both U.T.C. and B&W are in the power-generating equipment
business, with B&W a leading manufacturer of fossil-fuel
boilers, while U.T.C. is a big seller of gas turbines. With
the acquisition of B&W, U.T.C. would have had an even larger
share of the power-generation industry.
B. INTEREST BY McDERMOTT
As is shown in the financial statements exhibited in
Appendix B, McDermott ' s marine construction services business
had come upon hard times. Of interest to McDermott was the
fact that both their and B&W's businesses were similar. They
both were concerned with the energy business with B&W being
the manufacturer of power generation equipment while McDermott
constructs platforms for oil drilling operations. As
previously was stated, B&W was a leader in its business
field and was showing a nice financial picture to the manage-
ment of McDermott. With B&W's stock selling in the mid-30'
s
at the time of U.T.C.'s first offer of $42.00 per share, it
was obvious that the analysts sensed that B&W was going to
continue to grow and thus was worth more than its current
market value.
McDermott' s management believed that through a merger
with B&W the opportunity for major diversification of its
business was possible. It also believed that this merger
would reduce McDermott ' s concentration in its present
industry by expanding its participation in engineering and
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heavy construction activities, in energy and in energy-related
areas. McDermott believed that a merger of the two companies
and the resulting pooling of their combined capabilities
would enable them to supply resources to meet the ever in-
creasing challenges within the energy field. B&W also
believed that the merger would benefit their company and its
shareholders as well, particularly when U.T.C. initially was
seeking to take over B&W at $42.00 per share.
Another reason for McDermott ' s interest was that because
of their worsening financial picture, they were becoming a
prime candidate for takeover themselves. Merger with B&W
would make them harder to acquire than in their then present
condition.
As a result of these reasons and the subsequent success-
ful bidding war won against U.T.C, in August 1977 the board
of directors of B&W and McDermott unanimously approved the
merger and recommended to their respective shareholders to
vote in favor of the merger.
C. OFFERS BY U.T.C. AND McDERMOTT
As stated previously, in March 1977 U.T.C. made the
initial move by offering $42.00 per share for B&W stock.
This offer was rejected by B&W on April 4, and litigation
was brought against U.T.C. by B&W in the Federal District
Court of Ohio. The alleged violations by U.T.C. were of
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(1) the anti-trust laws, (2) Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (3)
the Securities Exchange Act and (4) the statute and common
27law of various states.
From April 6 through the close of business on May 13
McDermott purchased an aggregate of 1,205,600 shares of B&W
common stock (approximately 9.9 percent) in open market trans-
actions on the stock exchange. The purchase prices for
these shares ranged from $39,875 to $45,125 a share, for a
total purchase price of $51,566,022, including commissions.
Having followed the purchase of B&W stock by McDermott,
U.T.C. raised its unsuccessful bid of $42 to $48 in early
August 1977. Before B&W commented on this offer, McDermott
came in with their initial proposal for B&W stock, namely to
purchase 4.3 million shares at $55 per share.
Initially B&W's board of directors did not want to re-
commend this proposal by McDermott to its shareholders. It
continued to talk to McDermott, U.T.C. and various other
companies who had showed an interest in them, including
Rockwell International Corporation and Studebaker-Worthington,
Inc. Although these other companies were interested, only
McDermott and U.T.C. actually made offers for B&W. On
August 14, 1977, the board of directors consented to and
recommended the McDermott offer to its stockholders.
From then on the bidding war began. On August 18, U.T.C.
raised its $48 offer to $55 per share. McDermott followed
on August 19 with a bid of $60 per share. On August 23 U.T.C.
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increased its offer to $58.50 per share and McDermott
countered with an offer of $62.50 per share, the ultimate
winner.
The war was not yet over. On August 24, 1977, B&W's
board of directors declared a special dividend of $2.50 per
share payable on October 3, 1977 to stockholders of record
as of September 15, 1977. U.T.C. then announced that they
would pass through $1.25 of that dividend to the B&W stock-
holders who tendered their shares to United. McDermott,
on August 25th, went one step further and announced that in
addition to the $62.50 per share offer, they would pass
through the entire $2.50 dividend to thos shareholders who
tendered their shares to McDermott. In addition, they would
increase the number of shares to be purchased from 4.3 million
to 4.8 million. Together with the 1,205,600 shares it pur-
chased on the open market, McDermott would own approximately
49% of the B&W shares outstanding.
Later that same day, U.T.C. terminated its offer to
purchase any and all B&W common shares. In a statement
issued that day, Harry J. Gray said: "We continue to view
Babcock & Wilcox as a well-managed company with excellent
operating and financial strength. A pragmatic assessment
of the economic conditions surrounding the most recent J.
Ray McDermott offer has caused us to conclude that it is no
longer in the best interests of United Technologies 1
28
shareholders to pursue this matter further."
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D. BASIS FOR THE TERMS OF THE MERGER
The terms of the merger were the result of arm's length
negotiations between representatives of both companies.
"Among the factors considered in implementing the statement
in the offer with respect to the consideration to be re-
ceived by B&W stockholders in the combination, were the
assets, obligations, products, operations, and earnings of
each company, their management and the market value of the
capital stock of McDermott, as well as judgements with respect
to the prospects of each company, both as separate entities
29
and as a combined enterprise." Appendix A and B shows both
companies' financial statements over the past five to seven
years.
Exhibit III-l shows the comparative high and low stock
prices per share of McDermott and B&W common stock for the
years 1975 to 1977. One note of interest is that on
November 8, 1977 McDermott declared a two-for-one stock
split to be effective on January 16, 1978 for shares on
record as of December 15, 1977. The high and low stock
prices for McDermott therefore are adjusted to reflect this
in addition to the June 20, 1975 two-for-one stock split.
In February 1978 McDermott 's board of directors hired
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. to look at the terms
of exchange of the proposal merger from a financial viewpoint.
B&W, on the other hand, sought the services of Morgan Stanley






Quarter ended March 31
Quarter ended June 30
Quarter ended September 30
Quarter ended December 31
McDermott B&W
High Low High Low
21 1/4 14 7/8 19 5/8 13 1/2
27 1/2 17 3/4 27 3/8 15 1/4
27 7/8 21 27 17 3/4
24 5/8 16 3/4 20 1/4 17 1/2
1976
Quarter ended March 31
Quarter ended June 30
Quarter ended September 30
Quarter ended December 31
24 7/8 19 29 3/8 18 3/4
26 1/4 21 7/8 36 1/8 26 1/8
27 5/8 22 7/8 36 3/4 31 1/2
26 5/8 22 5/8 35 5/8 28 5/8
1977
Quarter ended March 31
Quarter ended June 30
Quarter ended September 30
Quarter ended December 31
25 3/4 21 5/8 40 1/4 28 1/4
29 1/4 25 1/8 47 1/4 38 1/2
29 1/4 22 1/2 60 5/8 41 1/4
59 1/4 54 1/4
EXHIBIT III-l
after their interests. Smith Barney reported to McDermott
that in their estimation the terms of the merger were fair
from the shareholders point of view. Morgan Stanley advised
B&W that the $2.20 convertible preferred stock and the $2.50
preferred stock into which each B&W common share would be
converted upon consummation of the merger would have a market
value of approximately $62.50.
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One final aspect of the merger terms was that both
McDermott and B&W agreed that if the merger was consummated,
five of the present directors of B&W, Messrs. George G. Zipf,
R.J. Cantwell, W.O. Baker, Walter B. Shaw and William L.
Wearly, would become directors of McDermott. In this way,
B&W's management policies could not be altered without
overcoming the objections of these board members.
As reported in March 31, 1978 New York Times, "Shareholders
of both J. Ray McDermott & Co. and the Babcock & Wilcox Co.
yesterday approved the merger of Babcock & Wilcox into a
31
wholly owned McDermott subsidiary." Under this agreement
the remaining shares of B&W common stock not already bought
by McDermott would be converted to McDermott preferred stock
according to the provisions of the merger agreement.
So climaxed one of the year's biggest acquisiton battles,
one that would eventually cost McDermott in excess of $7 50
million in its bid to acquire B&W.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
U.T.C.'s initial interest in B&W was due to B&W's leading
position in the power generation industry. U.T.C. Chairman
Harry J. Gray's philosophy for diversification was through
the acquisition of leading high technology companies.
McDermott entered the merger picture for two reasons, to aid
its financially troubled marine construction services divisions;
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and secondly, to avoid becoming a takeover target itself
because of its financial woes. The next two chapters will





This chapter will discuss the businesses of the two
merged companies. A general overview of the companies'
areas of operation, markets and competition within their
respective industries will be presented. Finally the
benefits each company expected to attain from the merger
are discussed.
A. THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY (B&W)
B&W, a New Jersey corporation, and its subsidiaries are
engaged in the design, manufacture and sale of products
classified into the following industry segments: steam
generating and associated equipment, tubular products,
refractory products, automated machines and machine tools
and control valves. In addition, recently B&W has formed
a unit to manufacture advanced composite materials for
32industrial use.
The steam generating and associated equipment and tubular
products divisions are the primary segments of B&W, and
together accounted for 93.4 percent of consolidated sales
and 90.9 percent of the consolidated income from operations
for the year ended 31 December 1977. Exhibit IV-1 below
shows the sales of steam generating and associated equipment
and tubular products for the five years ended 31 December 1977
38

For The Calender Year





customers $791,000 $913,100 $1,132,000 $1,308,000 $1,434,000
Intersegment sales 1,400 1,300 1,200 1,900 1,500
Total $792,400 $914,400 $1,133,200 $1,309,900 $1,435,500
Tubular products:
Sales to unaffiliated
customers $198,200 $271,800 $323,400 $280,200 $319,200
Intersegment sales 40,300 64,300 85,200 77,900 74,300
Total $238,500 $336,100 $408,600 $358,100 $393,500
Exhibit IV - 1
B. B&W'S AREAS OF OPERATION
1. Steam Generating Equipment
Steam generating equipment includes individually engi-
neered complete fossil fuel boilers, nuclear steam systems,
and nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel assemblies for electric
utility and marine applications as well as fossil fuel boilers
for industrial processes and power generation. Steam gener-
ating equipment also includes specially engineered accessories
and components, such as air heaters, fans, precipitators,
cleaning systems for heat transfer surfaces, nuclear reactor
components , control and performance computers, automatic con-
trols and instruments and nuclear control-rod devices. Associ-
ated equipment includes individually engineered recovery
processes and pollution control systems for the process and
39

utility industries, tubular hoods for basic oxygen and
electric furnaces, heavy pressure vessels and heat
exchangers, hollow forgings for steam piping and other uses
and reflective metallic thermal insulation. In addition to
designing and manufacturing the foregoing steam generating
and associated equipment, B&W through a separate construc-
tion unit also is engaged in the erection of certain of
33this and other equipment.
Major divisions within the steam generating equipment
area are:
a. Fossil Power Generation Division
Included in this division are coal-fired boilers,
B&W precipitators, sulfur dioxide removal systems, air heaters
and fans. Major recent contracts within this division were
for six 750-megawatt coal-fired boilers valued at $250 million
from the Middle South Utilities Company of New Orleans, a
540-megawatt coal-fired boiler from Cajun Electric Power
Cooperative, Inc. of New Roads, Louisiana, and a 364-megawatt
coa-fired radiant boiler from Lakeland, Florida, valued at
$35 million.
b. Industrial and Marine Division
Products include fuel-burning equipment, such as




c. B&W Construction Company
Activities include the erection of boilers, pre-
cipitators, scrubbers, and other power plant equipment as
well as a large volume of repair and alteration work on
existing units.
d. B&W Canada
B&W Canada supplies both fossil and nuclear
steam generating equipment for domestic and international
markets. Recent contracts, valued at $8 million combined,
were for sixteen nuclear steam generators and two 200-megawatt
coal-fired boilers from the Ontario Hydro Company.
e. Bailey Meter Company
Included in this division is the manufacture
and sale of control and monitoring equipment for steam gener-
ating equipment. Such products as the Model KA Pressure
Transmitter, the 1055 Computer, and Bailey's Conserver
Control System have been developed for use in industrial
and chemical processes, providing significant fuel savings
to such industries as steel, oil, chemical, and paper and
pulp.
f. Diamond Power Sepcialty Corporation
Diamond Power is the world's leading supplier
of utility and industrial boiler cleaning equipment. Recent
advances have occurred in the development of retractable
sootblowers designed to clean heat exchangers for the
petroleum, chemical, and other industries; and in the
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introduction of programmable microprocessor controls for
automatic sequencing of the cleaning process.
g. Nuclear Systems and Equipment Division
Included in this division are the construction
of nuclear reactors, nuclear components for the Navy and
special commercial nuclear projects such as the breeder
reactor plant in Clinch River; and most notably the nuclear
plant at Three Mile Island.
2. Tubular Products
Tubular products include stainless, alloy and carbon
steel, seamless and welded tubes and pipe, tubular and solid
shapes, extrusions, special metal tubes, welding fittings
and flanges, and seamless rolled rings. These are princi-
pally "specialty" products of high quality, engineered for
special applications. Material amounts of tubes are manu-
factured by B&W to satisfy its own requirements as well as
those of other manufacturers of steam generating equipment;
however, the major portion of B&W's tubes are sold to others
for use in the bearing, petroleum, machinery, primary metal,
34fabricated metal and construction industries.
Plants within the Tubular Products division are located
in Alliance, Ohio, Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, and Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Construction of a new oil-well tube finishing





Refractory products include kaolin clays, specially
engineered and vacuum formed ceramic fibers, insulating and
specialty firebrick, plastics, mortars, castables and special
oxide refractories. These refractories are used in high
temperature furnaces for various heating and heat treating
purposes and in other applications where the temperatures
and rates of cumbustion or chemical reactions are unusually
demanding.
The continuing worldwide need to conserve energy has
resulted in an increasing demand for the divisions * high-
temperature insulating materials. With advanced technology
and facilities for the development and manufacturing of
insulating and heat resistant products and systems, B&W's
refractories division is helping a broad range of industries




Automated machines and machine tools include individ-
ually engineered transfer or multi-station machines for pro-
duction lines, precision boring machines, broaching machines
and broaches, large grinders, cutting tools, hydraulic
accessories, production tracer lathes and numerical control
machines. This equipment is sold to manufacturers both for
use in their manufacturing processes and in the products
37
manufactured by them. With the increased demand within
the automobile industry for energy-efficient vehicles,
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Automated Machine Division's (AMD) demand for transfer lines,
lathes, broaching machines and cutting tools has increased
dramatically. This division is also a major supplier of
structural components for the Navy nuclear program.
5. Control Components
Control Components International (CCI) is a leader
in the manufacture of specialty control valves. These valves
are used in fossil and nuclear utility plants, in oil well
drilling equipment, and other places where accurate control
and noise suppression are required. In its market, through
the year ended 31 March 1979, CCI had approximately 15 per-
cent of the business against older entrenched competitors.
38In addition about 35 percent of their business is overseas.
6. Foreign Operations
B&W currently has major subsidiaries in Canada and
Germany engaged in the manufacture of steam generating and
associated equipment. B&W entered the nuclear market in
Germany in 1971 with the formation of Babcock-Brown Boveri
Reaktor, GmbH (BBR) , owned jointly by B&W and Brown Boveri
of West Germany. B&W's foreign operations have expanded
over the past several years to the point where they now
constitute approximately 13 percent of their total sales.
C. B&W'S MARKETING
B&W's steam generating and associated equipment is sold
to its customers in the United States and Canada through its
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own sales force and via independent sales agents to its
customers in foreign countries. Tubular products are sold
almost exclusively to its customers by its own sales force,
but are also sold to distributors. Substantially all of
B&W's refractory products, control components and automated
machines and machine tools are sold to its customers by its
own sales force, with the latter also being sold through
39independent sales agents and distributors.
Exhibit IV-2 below is an approximate distribution for
1976 and 1977 shipments by type of market. These percentages
are fairly constant over the previous five years, with the
exception of shipments to electric utilities which were
slightly lower in previous years (43 percent and 44 percent
in 1974 and 1975, respectively)
.
1977 1976
Electrical Utilities 52% 50%
Government 12 13
Warehouse and Distributions 8 7
Machinery 7 7
Transportation 4 4
Pulp and Paper 4 3
Chemical and Petroleum 3 5
Fabricated Metal Products 3 3






D. BENEFITS OF MERGER WITH J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC
Simply stated, B&W's benefit in merging with McDermott
was that it would stop the takeover attempt by U.T.C. If
this takeover had occurred it was feared that the top
executive level of the company, and especially the finance
divisions, would be terminated and filled with U.T.C.
personnel.
After the merger, it was expected that B&W's business
would be carried on under substantially its present opera-
ting management as a subsidiary of McDermott. The officers
of B&W at the time of the merger would become officers of
• . 40
such McDermott subsidiary.
Because both companies are engaged in a roughly similar
business, namely the energy field, it was felt by B&W manage-
ment that this merger would lead to a diversification and
ultimately to a stronger, more successful engineering
enterprise. McDermott seemed a better choice than U.T.C. as
a parent company in light of their similarities and U.T.C. 's
reorganization plans.
As stated on August 26, 1977 by chairman George C. Zipf,
"drawing upon the special capabilities of each component,
the combined company will have resources to meet the future
41
challenges of the energy business."
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E. J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO
.
, INC. (McDERMOTT)
McDermott, a Delaware corporation, was incorporated in
1946 as a successor to businesses which had been engaged in
providing construction services to the gas and petroleum
industry since the 1920' s. A pioneer in offshore platform
and pipeline construction in the Gulf of Mexico, McDermott'
s
services today principally consist of the engineering,
fabrication and installation of fixed offshore platforms,
pipelines and other facilities for development (as distin-
guished from exploratory) drilling and production operations
in most areas of the world where offshore gas and oil reserves
are being developed. McDermott also provides engineering and
construction services for oil production in shoreline and
marshland areas, principally in Louisiana and Texas, and
operates two shipyards in Louisiana for the construction,
repair and maintenance of tugboats, barges and other small
vessels. McDermott does not, however conduct drilling
42
operations.
Another McDermott area of operation through Hudson
Engineering Corporation and its subsidiaries, is the engi-
neering and construction of processing plants for the oil,
gas and petrochemical industries and the manufacture and
sale of large air-cooled heat exchangers.
Exhibit IV-3 reflects McDermott' s revenues and net











1973 $ 314,936 $ 43,463 $ 358,399
1974 379,311 46,445 425,756
1975 684,309 58,516 742,825
1976 1,010,105 91,973 1,102,078
1977 1,089,455 134,386 1,223,841
1978 1,116,119 177,592 1,293,711
1979 1,010,816 161,409 1,172,225
1980 982,038 262,052 1,244,090
NET OPERATING INCOME
(In Thousands]i






1973 $ 30,440 $ (3,186) $ 27,254
1974 44,966 1,451 46,417
1975 95,893 (2,611) 93,282
1976 219,752 10,529 230,281
1977 247,644 11,987 259,631
1978 205,559 15,364 220,923
1979 61,011 (893) 60,118




Marine Construction Services and for Onshore Construction
Services (principally Hudson)
.
F. McDERMOTT'S AREAS OF OPERATION
1. Marine Construction Services
McDermott's primary expertise is in the construction
of specialized offshore, fixed platforms and marine pipelines
used for development drilling, production and transportation
of oil and gas. These platforms, which are attached to the
ocean floor by pilings driven through their structured legs,
are permanent in nature as opposed to floating, jack-up and
semi- submersible rigs which are used mainly for exploratory
drilling. McDermott's platforms are engineered to support
great weights and to withstand the stresses involved in
undersea pumping and severe weather conditions and sea water
corrosion to which they are exposed for many years either as
production platforms for a number of completed wells or as
gathering and pumping stations. McDermott has installed its
43platforms in waters up to 1025 feet deep.
As the water depths of its operations increases,
new techniques and equipment for these extensive underwater
pipelaying operations are needed. McDermott has manufactured
pipelines coated with concreat that are buried under the
ocean floor with the use of underwater jet trenching equipment
They are now able to lay pipelines which have a 72 inch out-
side diameter (including concrete) . Due to the depths of the
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water at which these pipes are layed, McDermott also conducts
extensive diving operations. Because of the sophistication
required at these depths equipment such as diving bells and
an underwater habitat are required and used.
2. Marine Equipment
McDermott operates one of the largest fleets of
marine equipment used in offshore construjtion. The nucleus
of a "construction spread" is a large derrick barge, pipe-
laying barge, pipeburying barge or combination derrick-
pipelaying barge capable of offshore operations over an
extended period of time in remote locations. At the time of
the merger McDermott owned and operated nine derricks, nine
44pipelaymg, ten combination, and four pipeburying barges.
These barges range in length from 240 to 420 feet, have lift-
ing capacities of 250 to 1100 tons and have quarters for as
many as 272 men.
One new semi-submersible construction barge currently
in the construction phase will measure 406 feet long, have a
lifting capacity of 2,000 short tons, quarter 54 8 men and
a cost of approximately $62 million.
3. Fabrication Yards
McDermott' s principal fabrication yard is located
in Morgan City, Louisana. At this location, McDermott has
pipe-rolling facilities for the production of large diameter
heavy-wall pipe used in fabricating the platforms, buildings
designed for "under-roof " fabrication of large structures,
50

and modern automatic welding machines, lifting equipment,
machine tools and other equipment necessary for the fabri-
45
cation of the largest of offshore structures.
In addition to this main fabrication yard in Morgan
City, McDermott also operates yards in the following
locations: Harvey, Louisiana, Dubai, United Arab Emirates,
Warri, Nigeria, West Africa, Singapore, Southeast Asia,
Batam Island, Indonesia, and Inverness, Scotland. The
Harvey yard is small and used for the fabrication of smaller
offshore structures and pipelining accessories. The yards
in Dubai, Warri, Singapore, and Batam Island are capable of
fabricating a full range of offshore structures, and consist
principally of movable cranes, welding equipment, machine
tools and other fabricating equipment. The Inverness yard
was established after 1972 and services McDermott' s North
Sea customers. It was principally designed for "under-roof
"
fabrication.
Expiration dates included renewal options of the
leases covering the land for the fabrication yards are as
follows:
Morgan City, La. Years 2001-2024
Warri, Nigeria Year 2065
Singapore Year 2000
Dubai, U.A.E. Year 1980
4 . Engineering
In connection with its construction activities,
McDermott has in excess of 650 engineers. With their
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expertise in the design of onshore and offshore gas and
petroleum production facilities, they add technical and
professional support in the field (i.e. at the fabrication
yards and in offshore construction) and also help design
McDermott's floating equipment.
5. Onshore Construction Services
Hudson Engineering Corporation, acquired by
McDermott in 1969, has been engaged since 194 in the engi-
neering and construction of processing plants for the oil,
gas, chemical, petrochemical and mineral industries, princi-
pally within the United States. Included in such plants
are nature gas processing plants for production of ethane,
propane, butane and natural gasoline, refinery processing
units, oil and gas pipeline pumping stations, chemical and
petrochemical plants and plants producing sulfur, uranium
ore concentrate and other minerals. Hudson also manufactures
heat exchangers, primarily for refineries, chemical plants
and electrical generating plants. These units utilize air
cooling for dissipation of process plant heat directly into
the atmosphere.
Operations involving construction of processing
plants by Hudson are done on their customers own sites.
The material used for construction is manufactured by out-
side sources, designed to meet Hudson's specifications.
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G. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF McDERMOTT ' S OPERATIONS
McDermott currently has major spreads of onshore and
offshore drilling equipment located in the following areas:
Gulf of Mexico, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the North
Sea, offshore West Africa and the east coast of South
America.
1. Gulf of Mexico
Activity within the Gulf of Mexico has continued to
be at a high rate because of the United States 1 attempt to
lessen their dependence on imported oil. The world's tallest
and heaviest steel platform, the Cognac platform, was recently
erected by McDermott in 1,025 feet of water. Along with the
platform, 23 miles of pipeline was layed at water depths of
1000 feet, another first. Since this installation, McDermott
has received a contract for design, fabrication, and instal-
lation of a 968 foot jacket to the placed in the East Breaks
field of the Gulf in 1981. This jacket's height will be
second only to Cognac
.
2. Middle East
The Middle East's operations have been active, but
not at a high rate. The one major project undertaken is
the "Dugas" onshore/offshore gas gathering and processing
facility at Dubai, U.A.E. Other contracts awarded to




This area has the greatest potential and expecta-
tions for increased activity are high. Gas Fields with the
biggest potential are located in Thailand, the Northwest
Shelf of Australia, and the Philippines. The biggest
project currently is the Conoco Udang platform, located in
the South China Sea.
4. North Sea
Although interest in the area is high, activity is
waning. This is in part due to policies of the governments
of North Sea countries that have created uncertainty about
the economies of production. The hope is that the new,
more conservative United Kingdom government will provide a
47
more conducive climate for oil and gas development. The
major fabrication yard at Ardersier, Scotland has three
major projects in progress.
5. West Africa
Major offshore pipelaying and installation projects





Offshore oil fields recently undertaken are off the
coast of Brazil, while a dual 38-inch, 23-mile pipeline was
recently completed linking Margarita Island to mainland
Veneuela, one supplying fresh water to the island.
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H. McDERMOTT'S xMARKETS AND COMPETITION
McDermott * s principal customers for its offshore con-
tracting operations consist of the larger domestic and
international oil and gas companies. Most of McDermott'
s
customers contract for the design, construction and instal-
lation of specific platforms, pumping stations or processing
facilities. Contracting is done on a fixed price, cost
plus a day rate basis. Contracting undertaken in foreign
areas of operation generally call for payment in United
States dollars.
McDermott' s chief competitors are corporations such as
Halliburton, Schlumberger Ltd., Helmerich & Payne and
Stewart & Stevenson Service, Inc., among others. Exhibit
IV-4 shows the comparative financial data, for fiscal year
1979 of the leading companies within the Oil Services and
Equipment Industry.
I. BENEFITS OF MERGER WITH BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
As stated in the August 9, 1978 New York Times, "J. Ray
McDermott & Company reported yesterday a 29.2 percent drop
in its earnings for the first fiscal quarter ended June 30,
to $32.3 million, or 76 cents a share, from $45.6 million,
or $1.45 a share, in the similiar three months last year....









1 Halliburton Co 6,641.6
2 McDermott & Co 3.144.6
3 Schlumberser Lid 2.683.9
A Baker Intl. 919.0
5 Huunes Tool Co 659 4
6 Santa Felnt'l 547.6
7 Zapata 520.8
8 Smith Infl 451.7
9 Marathon Mfg 406.0
10 Sedcolnc t389.4
11 Ocean Drilling 256.8
12 Parker Drilling 241.1
13 Tidewater Inc 216.7
14 Western Co.. N.A 215.7
15 Stewart & Stevenson.... 211.3
16 Reading & Bates 195.1
17 Rowan Cos 143.7
18 Texas Infl 141.0
19 Helmench & Payne 126.4
20 Global Marine 124.5
21 Gearhan-Owen 106.1
22 KenaiCorp 47.3
Net Income ($ Mill.)
SANK COMPANY AMOUNT
1 Schlumberger Ltd 502.0
2 Halliburton Co 397.0
3 McDermott&Co 93.0
4 Baker Infl 77.2
5 Hughes Tool Co 69.7
6 Santa Fe Infl 55.8
7 Smith Infl 52.2
8 Sedcolnc +43.6
9 Parker Drilling 31.2
10 Tidewater Inc 30.3
11 Ocean Drilling 27.5
12 Heunerich &. Payne 26.8
13 Marathon Mfg 24.8
14 Reading & Bates 22.6
15 Rowan Cos 22.6
16 Western Co.. N.A. 19.0
17 Gearhart-Owen 13.6
18 Global Marine 8.2






1 Helmench & Payne 31.3
2 Schlumberger Ltd 28.6
3 Ocean Drilling 27.1
4 Tidewater Inc +24.1
5 Rowan Cos 23.7
6 Gearhart-Owen 23.6
7 Parker Drilling 23.6
8 Smith Infl 22.2
9 Western Co.. N.A 20.4
10 Reading & Bates 19.6
11 Hughes Tool Co 19.4
12 Sedcolnc +19.4
13 Santa Fe Infl 18 3
14 KenaiCorp 17.7
15 Baker Infl 16.8
16 Marathon Mfg 12.9
17 Zapata 12.9
18 Halliburton Co 9.9
19 Stewart 4 Stevenson.... 8.7
20 McDermottiCo 5.8
21 Global Marine 4.0
22 Texas Infl 2.4
Average 17.8
Return on Capital (%)
RANK COMPANY AMOUNT
1 Schlumberger Lut 25.1
2 Halliburton Co.- 16.0
3 Gearhart-Owen— 15.9
4 Smith Infl _ 15.2
5 Marathon Mfg . _ U.3
6 Helmench &. Pav* 14.0
7 Hushes Tool Co_ 12.8
8 Baker Infl 11.2
9 Parker Drilling _ 10.6
10 Tidewater Inc +10.2
11 Stewart & Stevenson 9.1
12 KenaiCorp _ 8.4
13 Rowan Cos — 8.3
14 Santa Fe Int'l 7.9
15 Sedcolnc — +7.0
16 Reading & Bates—. 5.8
17 Western Co., N.A. 5.1
18 Ocean Drilling 4.4
19 McDermon & C»_ 4.3
20 Global Marine 3.5
21 Zapau — 0.8





Ha.hburton Co 2.299 5
Schlumberger Ltd 1.617.0
McDcrmottACo 1.361.1
Smu Fe Infl 824.8
Zapata 819.1
Ocean Drilling 8119
Sedco Ine +728 .0
Reading £ Biles 497.6
Baier Infl 462.9
Hughes Tool Co 334.2






Helmench £ Piyne 169.3








1 Halliburton Co_ 1.323.0
2 McDermort 4 Co 920.8
3 Schlumberger L«d 904 9
4 Zapau _ 635.7
3 Sinia Fe Inf1 S7I.6
6 Ocean Drilling.. 548.6
7 Sedcolnc _ 503.4
8 Baker lntl _ 335.3
9 Reading £ Bates 315.5
10 Ro»anCos 277.6
11 Western Co.. NA. 258.1
12 Hughes Tool Co 248.7
13 Parker Dnlling 222.2
14 Globai Manne.— 220.2
15 Tidewater Inc +198.0
16 Smith Int'l 134.0
17 Teaas Int'l _ 127.1
18 Helemench £ Pavne 97.6
19 Marathon Mfg- 85.8
20 Gearhart-Owea 43.3
21 KenaiCorp 29.0




1 Schlumeerger Ltd 55.5
2 Sie»en £ Stevenson JO 8
3 Smith Infl 390
* Gearhart-Owen 31.4
5 Halliburton Co 30.0
6 Marathon Mfg 28.9
7 Hughes Tool Co 28.0
8 Helmench £ Payne 27.5
9 Baker Infl 23.0
10 Parker Drilling 140
11 Tidewater Ine +13.5
12 KenaiCorp 13 4
13 McDennott * Co 10.1
14 Santa Feuvfl 9 8
15 Sedcolnc +8 6
16 Rowan Cos 8.1
17 Western Co.. N A 7.4
18 Reading It Sates 7.2
19 Ocean Drilling 5.0






1 HaSbunon Co ,06.2
2 Scfc-imberger Ltd S8S.3
3 McCermott £ Co 8*1 i
4 Bate Int'l 256.6
! Hisses Tool Co 235.3
6 SnaS Int'l rail
7 Zarua 147.5
8 SaraFelnfl Ill 6
9 Marathon Mfg 51.6
10 Sedcolnc +62.4
11 Finer Drilling ol 3
12 Stewart £ Stevenson. 54 6
13 Racing £ Bates 30.9
14 Tioewater Inc +45.7
13 Gearhart-Owen 3S.7
16 Hecnench £ Payne 36 2
17 WeBern Co., N.A 29 5
II Tern Infl 2S.7
19 RcwuCos 22.3
20 Ocean Drilling 16.0
21 Kerai Corp 14 6
22 Gicaal Marine 11.0
Price-Earnings Ratio
RANK COMPANY iMOUNT
1 Santa Fe Infl 28.
1
2 Ocean Dnlling 20.5
3 Geirnan-Owen. 17.5
4 Schlumberger Ltd 17.5
5 McDermoti £ Co 14.6
6 Zapata 118
7 Ba«erlnfl 12.5
8 Western Co.. NA. 1 1.7
9 Sedcolnc 11.0
10 Heiaench £ Pavne 10.9
11 RrwanCoa 10.9
12 Halliburton Co 10.5
13 Smith Int'l 9.5
14 Parker Dnllmi 9.0
15 KenaiCorp 8.9
lb Tidewater Inc 8.7
17 Hughes Tool Co 8.6
18 Global Manne 8.3
19 Reading £ Bates 8.3
20 Marathon Mfg 8.2





1 McDermo-.t 4 Co
2 Reading £ Bates
3 Tidewater Inc




8 Stewart £ Stevenson...








17 Helmench £ Payne....
18 Parker Dnlling
19 Western Co.. NA.
20 Rowan Cos
21 KenaiCorp
























1 Western Co.. N.A. 121.4
2 Zaolta 121.3
3 Marathon Mfg 118.2
4 Stewart £ Stevenson 117.2
5 Baker lntl 116.1
6 Global Manoe 115.1
7 Parker Dnlling 113.8
8 Ocean Dnlirng 112.2
9 Smith Int'l 1 1 1.3
10 Hughes Tool Co 110 9
11 Helmench £ Payne 110.8
12 Gearhart-Owen 110.7
13 Schlumberger Ltd 110.3
14 Rowan Cos 104.7
13 KenaiCorp 99.2
16 Halliburton Co 97.7
17 Tidewater Inc 94.3
18 Sedcolnc 83 1
19 McDermort * Co 77.4
20 Santa Fe lnf! 74.0






2 Marathon Mfg 205.2
3 Rowan Cos 203.0
4 Western Co.. N.A 203.0
5 Paraer Dnlhng 176.8
s Hecoenca £ Payne 1516
7 Sciiumberger Lid 151.6
8 Snath Infl 147
9 Sera Fe Infl 146.0
10 Baier Int'l 144.3




15 Ocean Drilling 90.6
16 Sedcolnc 83.0
17 Heches Tool Co
18 KenaiCorp
19 Reading a. Bates









This quote, from the New York Times, typifies why
McDermott wanted to merge with B&W. After the friendly
merger between the two companies, McDermott' s profits were
at record levels, due largely to B&W. Even B&W's operations,
however, could not offset the decline in earnings within
McDermott. As seen in the financial statements, McDermott'
s
price/earnings ratio was about 4 to 1 at the time of the
merger war. Both the companies' businesses are related, so
by being able to merge with B&W, McDermott could hope to
make its stock more attractive to the investor.
What McDermott hoped to gain from the acquisition of
B&W is obvious. B&W, a maker of power plants for electric
utilities, had a big piece of a market that was generally
expected to grow steadily over the next 10 to 20 years.
McDermott was flush with cash but needed to diversify in
time to soften the blow from the expected decline in the
49
offshore construction business.
In addition, with McDermott ' s financial picture growing
steadily poorer, they were becoming a prime target for a
takeover themselves, perhaps by a conglomerate of U.T.C.'s
size. With the company experiencing financially hard times,
a company such as United Technologies could approach
McDermott 's shareholders and make them a very substantial
offer. These two reasons are the basis on which McDermott




This chapter discussed the business of B&W and McDermott.
As seen B&W is primarily concerned with the power generation
systems and tubular products, while McDermott is involved
in the marine construction services. B&W hoped to find a
favorable "corporate parent" in McDermott in light of U.T.C.'s
attempted acquisition. Conversely, what McDermott hoped to
gain from the merger was help in their financial woes, as
a result of their decreased marine construction business.
In the next chapter the two companies' financial position
will be analyzed by reviewing the trends of key financial






One set of very useful and important tools in financial
analysis is the use of ratios. Ratios are simply a means of
showing the relationships between different key financial
figures within a company's financial statements. The Babcock &
Wilcox Co. (B&W) and J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. ' s (McDermott)
financial statements are included in Appendixes A and B, res-
pectively. Some of the ratios are general in nature and apply
to any business operation; while others are tailored specifically
to a certain industry. Within the succeeding sections these
ratios will be described and analyzed with respect to B&W and
McDermott. For each ratio one example has been shown to dem-
onstrate the mechanics in computing these ratios.
1. Financial Ratios
a. Short-term Liquidity Ratios
(1) Current Ratio
The ratio of current assets=to current
liabilities gives a measure of the extent to which current
assets are financed by more permanent sources of funds.
This ratio is computed as follows:
„ _ .. Current AssetsCurrent Ratio = r= r—=-i
—
i * •, • ±.Current Liabilities
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Example: For calendar year 1977 , B&W's current
ratio equals (879,500) * (699,200) or 1.26.
(2) Acid Test Ratio . Also called the quick
ratio, this ratio shows the company's ability to pay current
liabilities without liquidating its inventory. A ratio of
greater than 1.0 is generally desired. This ratio is
computed as follows:
,.
. , _ Cash + Receivables + Short-Term InvestmentsAcid Test = = r T •—, • . .Current Liabilities
Example: For calendar year 1977, B&W's acid test
equals (63,300 + 80,300 + 233,100+215,700) v (699,200) or 0.85
(3) Average Collection Period . This ratio mea-
sures the effectiveness of its credit granting and collection
activities. This ratio is computed as follows:
_ „ , Net SalesAverage Days Sales = Days in Year
,. ,-.
-i i -r. • j Net ReceivablesAverage Collection Period = - - pt-tr Average Days Sales
Example: For calendar year 1977, B&W's Average
Collection Period equals (233,100,000) * (5,143,013.7) or
45.3 days.
b. Profitability Ratios
(1) Profit Margin . This ratio, which relates
only to the income statement, simply expresses the percent
of each sales dollar, on the average, that represents profit
This ratio is computed as follows:
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-.. .. Net Income after TaxesProfit Margin = Net Sales
Example: For calendar year 1977, B&W s profit
margins equals (61,800) * (1,977,200) or 3.3 percent.
(2) Earnings Per Share . Earnings per share
provide a measure of the profitability that can be readily
adjusted for the number of shares owned. This ratio is
computed as follows:
_, _, _. Net Income After TaxesEarnings Per Share = =? *=
—
c z _. =3 Average Number of Shares of
Common Stock Outstanding
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W
s
earnings per share equals (61,800,000) * (12,213,391) or $5.06,
c. Long-Term Solvency and Equity Position
(1) Total Debt To Total Assets . Called the debt
ratio, this ratio measures the percentage of total assets pro-
vided by all creditors. It measures the riskiness of the
company from the lenders viewpoint. This ratio is computed
as follows:
t> w* « *. Total DebtDebt Ratio = Total Assets
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W s debt
ratio equals (876,500) * (1,309,700) or 66.9 percent.
(2) Long Term Debt To Capitalization . Total
capitalization equals long-term debt plus owners equity.
This ratio shows the importance of long-term debt in the
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total long-term financing of the company. This ratio is
computed as follows:
Long-Term Debt to Capitalization = Long-Term Debt—3 r Total Capitalization
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W' s ratio
equals (147,000)* (147,400 + 26,800 + 89,500 + 351,700) or
23.9 percent.
(3) Owner's Equity To Total Liabilities . This
ratio summarizes the relationship between equity and total
liabilities and reflects the company's reliance on debt in
financing its operations. The ratio is computed as follows:
Owner's Equity to Total Debt
- g^S'Sl5llg±M
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's
ratio equals (433,200) v (876,500) or 49.4 percent.
(4) Owner's Equity To Total Equities . This
ratio indicates the relative amount of total resources
provided by the owners of the company to the company as a
whole. The ratio is computed as follows:
_ . _ _ . , _ Owner ' s EquityOwner's Equity to Total Equities = Total Equity
(i.e. liabilities
plus owners 's equity)
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's
ratio equals (433,200) * (1,309,700) or 33.1 percent.
(5) Net Income To Net Working Capital . Net
working capital represents the cushion available to the
business for carrying inventories and receivables, and for
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financing day-to-day operations. This ratio could also be
considered a measure of operating performance as well since
it does include net income. This ratio is computed as
follows:
_ xt tt i • /-.i Net Income After TaxesNet Income to New Working Capital = Net working Capital
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W
s
ratio equals (61,800) * (180,300) or 34.2 percent,
d. Market Tests
(1) Price/Earnings Ratio . This ratio measures
the relationship between the current market price of the com-
pany's common stock and its earnings per share. It therefore
is an indicator of the future potential of the stock. This
ratio is computed as follows:
„ ,„ _ , . Current Market Price Per SharePrice/Earnings Ratio = Earnings Per share
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's
price/earnings ratio equals (60 1/2 * 5.06) and (28 1/4 * 5.06)
or a range of 11.9 to 4.6.
(2) Dividend Yield Ratio . This ratio measures
the current return to the investor, against the cost of
investment as indicated by the current market price per share.
This ratio is computed as follows:
_. .,
-,„ • ijt-,^- Dividends Per ShareDividend Yield Ratio = Market Price Per Share
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's
dividend yield ratio equals (3.93 * 60 1/2) and (3.93 * 28 1/4)




(1) Sales to Inventory . This ratio is a means
of looking at how fast a company's inventory is turning into
sales. This ratio is computed as follows:
„ *, ^ Net SalesSales to Inventory = =
-1 Inventory
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's ratio
equals (1,877,200 * 287,100) or 6.54 times.
(2) Net Sales to Net Working Capital . This ratio
provides a measurement of how effectively the company is turn-
ing its working capital and the margin of its operating funds.
This ratio is computed as follows:
Net Sales to Net Working Capital = Net Working Capital
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's
ratio equals (1,877,200) t (180,300) or 10.41 times.
(3) Net Sales to Fixed Assets . This ratio mea-
sures the extent to which the fixed assets of the company are
contributing to its revenue. This ratio is computed as
follows:
Net Sales to Fixed Assets = Net Fixed Assets
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's
ratio equals (1,877,200) * (379,900) or 4.94 times.
(4) Net Sales to Total Assets . This ratio is
frequently called asset turnover. It provides as indication
as to the size of asset commitment required for a given level
of sales, or conversely, the sales dollars generated for each
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dollar of investment. This ratio is computed as follows:
m Net SalesAsset Turnover = Total Assets
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's
asset turnover ratio equals (1,877,200)* (1,309,700) or
1.43 times.
f. Return on Investments
(1) Return on Equity . This ratio relates the
amount of income to the amount of investment that was committed
to earning that income. It is considered one of the true
tests of a company's profitability picture. The ratio is
computed as follows:
_'
_, • . Net Income After TaxesReturn on Equity = ^ -. - .-rn 2 Owner ' s Equity
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's equity
ratio equals (61,800) * (433,200) or 14.3 percent.
(2) Return on Assets . This ratio relates income
to the amount of total assets used. It measures management's
performance in using all of the resources available to them.
The ratio is computed as follows:
_ _ Net Income Before Interest and TaxesReturn on Assets = Total Assets
Example: For the calendar year 1977, B&W's





Exhibits V-l and V-2 are summary tables of the financial
ratios of B&W and McDermott, respectively. Wherever pos-
sible industry norms for each company are presented for com-
parison. Standards for all the ratios are difficult to obtain
due to the difficulty in comparing B&W and McDermott with
any other companies, especially since their merger. It is
the author's intention to show the individual companies'
financial trends and compare them whenever Dossible to
industry standards as published bv Dun & Bradstreet, Standard
& Poor's and Moody's Investors Service.
1. Short-Term Liquidity
Tn looking *t t^»e ratios dealing with liquidity, it
appears that while B&W's trend have been fairly consistent
over the past five years, they appear to be lower than
industry norms. Conversely, while McDermott 's trends in
average collection period has fluctuated tremendously, all
their ratios are greater than their industry standards. For
the collection period trends no standard was available for
McDermott 's industry. The current and quick ratios, display-
ed in Exhibits V-3 and V-4, of both companies have been
steady over the time period. While McDermott 's trend has
been comparable to its industry norm, B&W's has not. What
these trends seem to indicate is that B&W's cash and
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The Babcock & Wilcox Co.
Summary of Financial Ratios
for calendar year ending 31 December
1977
Industry 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973
Current Ratio 2.2 1.26 1.23 1.39 1.63 1.32
Acid Test Ratio 1.0 0.85 0.71 0.78 0.93 0.79
Average Collection Period
(Days) 49 45.3 36.9 48.5 53.6 60.7
Profit Margin 3.0% 3.3% 3.1% 2.7% 2.7% 2.1%
Earnings Per Share $3.50 $5.06 $4.37 $3.49 $2.82 $1.82
Total Debt to Total Assets — 66.9% 63.0% 67.0% 67.7% 62.3%
Long Term Debt to Capital 25.0% 23.9% 17.1% 29.5% 40.1% 19.9%
Owner ' s Equity to Total
Liabilities — 49.4% 58.7% 49.2% 47.8% 60.5%
Owner ' s Equity to Total Equity — 33.1% 36.9% 32.9% 32.3% 37.7%
Net Income to Net Working Cap. 16.6% 34.2% 38 .6% 19.2% 12.3% 16.4%
Price/Earnings Ratio 8.4- 11.9- 8.4- 7.8- 13.2- 20.7-
16.7 5.6 4.3 3.9 4.1 11.6
Dividend Yield Ratio 2.5%-5% 6%-14% 3%-6% 3%-6% 2%-7% 2%-4%
Net Sales to Inventory 6.6 6.54 5.45 4.56 4.15 4.80
Net Sales to Net Working Cap. 5.2 10.41 12.29 7.10 4.59 7.91
Net Sales to Fixed Assets — 4.94 4.71 4.71 4.38 4.20
Net Sales to Total Assets — 1.43 1.51 1.38 1.21 1.26
Return on Equity 13.0% 14.3% 14.2% 12.4% 10.8% 6.9%
Return on Assets 6.5% 9.6% 8.9% 7.3% 5.6% 4.4%
Exhibit V-l
Source: Dun & Bradstreet, Key Business Ratios, 1977
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without its inventories, does not
provide a large enough sa,fety margin to cover current
liabilities.
In conclusion, although there is no industry norm to
compare McDermott^s collection period against, overall they
appear very liquid. Conversely, B&W's liquidity picture is
not as bright. Their trends are, however, fairly stable,
and their collection period trend is comparable to the norm
which shows a good credit and collection policy towards
their customers.
2. Profitability
The two profit ratios, displayed in Exhibits V-6
and V-7, are profit margin and earnings per share. With
respect to its profitability, it seems that B&W has an
impressive operating performance over the five year period,
with increased sales, net income and earnings. B&W's profit
margin has ranged between 2.1 to 3.3 percent, which is well
within the industry standard of two to four percent.
The second trend, earnings per share, has been
increasing, up $3.24 from 1973 to 1977. This trend is
attributable to the significant increase in net income, up
179 percent, with only a 0.5 percent increase in the number
of shares outstanding.
The reverse holds true for McDermott. Both of
their trends have taken substantial down-turns since 1977.
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especially in the foreign operations area, McDermott's sales
revenues and profits have taken a dramatic turn for the worse
since 1977. As reported in McDermott's 1979 annual report,
"the temporary surplus of worldwide oil productability over
demand in 1977 and 1978 tended to restrain oil prices and to
discourage both oil companies and producing-country govern-
ments from pushing the development of promising discoveries.
The construction capacity built by McDermott's industry
during the peak demand years of 1975 and 1976 contained to
52
exceed the demand for services."
In these ratios, the decline in the trend started in
1977. The company's sales revenues have increased since 1977
due largely to B&W's consolidation into the financial state-
ments. In 1978 revenues increased over $69 million due
largely to the culmination of five years of growth of world-
wide hydrocarbon development in offshore areas. But the 1979
increase was attributable to B&W's operations in the amount
exceeding $2 billion. This figure was offset by McDermott's
marine and onshore construction operations' revenues which
decreased by over $190 million. The majority of this decrease
was from its foreign operations.
Since 1977 McDermott has experienced increases in its
costs and expenses due to lower utilization of company-operated
equipment in 1977, and in 1978-1979 due to the relocation of
certain operations of one of the company's foreign areas and




experienced in certain nuclear contracts. This lower
utilization is the result of the continuation of a worldwide
slowdown in hydrocarbon development in offshore areas and
thus an increase in foreign competition. The company has
stated that it expects this lower utilization to continue
through fiscal year 19 80.
3. Long-Term Solvency and Equity Position
While section 1 of this analysis dealt with
liquidity, or short-term ability to meet financial obligations,
this section looks at its long-term picture of meeting obli-
gations, its solvency. There are five ratios within this
section, displayed by Exhibits V-8 through V-12.
The composite long-term solvency picture for B&W
shows that all the trends have been fluctuating over the five
year time period. The long term debt to capitalization and
net income to net working capital trends have been fluctuat-
ing close to industry norms, with the latter increasing above
the norm since 1975. However, B&W's debt ratio has been
increasing slightly from 1973 to 1977. The major contribut-
ing factor to the fluctuation in the debt ratios is the fact
that long-term debt has been decreasing, down 41 percent from
1974 to 1977.
Thus long-term financing has become a smaller part
of the company's total financing picture. In view of the
increasing prime interest rates on short-term notes, this






































































1973 1974 1975 1976
YEAR
EXHIBIT V- 6
1977 1978 1979 i
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trend for the company. The significant increase in notes
payable in 1977 was attributed to the fact that the company
converted borrowings on certain bank lines of credits for its
Canadian subsidiary B&W Canada Ltd. to a $25 million note
54
agreement, payable beginning December 1, 19 82.
There was, however, an increase from 1976 to 1977
of $54 million in long-term financing. This increase was
attributed to 8-1/2 percent notes, payable beginning January 1,
551983. D
The next two ratios, owner's equity to total li-
abilities and owner's equity to total equity, have been fairly
constant, with only minor fluctuations during the five year
period. The 1976 peak in the two trends was due to a reduc-
tion on total liabilities for the year. This was attributable
to reduced bank borrowings of short-term notes, and the
56
repayment of an outstanding term loan of $100 million.
As of 1977, 49.4 percent of the company's assets
were financed by the owners, down 11 percent from the 1973
figure. This trend seems to be favorable from a profit
standpoint. Financing by owners as compared to the creditors
is far less risky over the long run. Thus, this consistent
trend for B&W shows a favorable safety factor. McDermott's
trends, like B&W's, have been fluctuating from 1973 to 1979.
During the years 1978 and 1979 the company's debt ratio
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EXHIBIT V- 12
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liabilities is the substantial increase in provisions for
warranty expense, accured liabilities, accounts payable and
long term debt.
With respect to the reliance on debt to finance
its operations, especially long term financing, it appears
that McDermott is not overly committed. However, marked
increases in long term debt occurred in 1975 and again in
1978. The 1975 increase was due to the issuance of three
long term contracts, an 8.9 percent note due in 19 84; a
9.7 percent sinking fund debenture due 199 9 and a revolving
57
credit agreement note totalling $50 million. Together
these three notes totalled $135 million. In 1978 prior un-
secured debts of B&W totalling $131 million, and revolving
credit notes payable totalling $177 million accounted for a
large majority of the increase. These two time periods do
however coincide with increases in the prime interest rates
on short term loans.
The final area of concern is that of McDermott'
s
net income to net working capital. Since 1976 there has been
a steep decline showing an unfavorable picture in its financ-
ing of day-to-day operations. Although net working capital
increased slightly, net income decreased. Contributing to
this decline was the rapid increase of costs and expenses
and the large increase in interest expense (66 percent and
94 percent in 1978 and 1979, respectively). These interest
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expense increased resulted from consolidation of interest
expense on debt carried by BSW's divisions, and also the
additional borrowings related to the investment in B&W.
4. Market Tests
There are two ratios within this section that
deal with the company's "market worth" of a share of its
stock. The first is the price/earnings ratio and the second
is the dividend yield ratio. These market tests attempt to
relate the current market price of a share of stock to some
indicator of the profit that might accure to the investor.
These ratios are displayed by Exhibits V-13 and V-14,
Both of B&W's ratios are well within the norms
for their industry. B&W's price/earnings ratio trend had
been on the decline for several years , but turned around in
1975 and since had been increasing. From 1973 to 1977 the
company's earnings per share increased by $3.24. The reason
for the drop in the P/E ratio from 1973 to 1975 was a marked
drop in the price per share of common stock during the years
1974 and 1975. This trend is comparable to the stock market
in general during this time period. The economy was in a
recession and therefore stock market prices were generally
in a depressed state. The major reason for the significant
increase in the stock price in 1977 was the merger efforts
put forth by both United Technologies and McDermott.
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The dividend yield ratio shows the current return
to the investor against his investment. B&W's ratio trend has
been increasing over the five year period. Their dividends
per share from 1973 to 1975 stayed at $.80, but since then
have increased to $3.93, The large increase in 1977 was
attributed to the special $2.50 dividend declared in August
by B&W's board of directors, in the midst of the bidding war
by U.T.C. and McDermott.
Jointly it appears that the market value of a
share of B&W stock is favorable, with an increasing trend
over the several years prior to its merger with McDermott.
In contrast, McDermott' s market picture is
questionable. Since 1977 McDermott 's earnings per share have
decreased due to the decline in net income. In addition the
company's dividend yield has also been increasing. While
this may seem good at first glance, it would appear that
during this low period of productivity and sales, that the
company could be plowing these funds back into the company
instead of increasing its dividends. In both ratios, McDermott '
s
trend has not been comparable with the industry norm, over
the years 1975 to 1979.
5. Asset Utilization
In general, the area of asset utilization tries
to show how well a company is managing its assets. Are the
assets being utilized to increase profits, or are they
becoming dormant and thus not contributing at all? In this
80
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area of analysis, four ratios will be discussed, all of
which relate to the net sales of the company. These ratios
are dispalyed Exhibits V-15 through V-18.
The general trend of all B&W s ratios is favor-
able, with various fluctuations during the five year period.
Sales to inventory and sales to total assets trends have
been fairly flat and increasing slightly. This shows a
favorable asset commitment towards producing sales revenues.
It also appears that B&W has not changed this asset committ-
ment policy dramatically since 1973.
The one trend that has not fluctuated, but rather
increased steadily is the net sales to fixed assets. Over
the five year period the trend has increased 17 percent, with
sales increasing 77 percent, but fixed assets increased only
50 percent. The reason appears to be that while plant, pro-
perty and equipment had been increasing by a lesser rate
each year, from 11.8 percent to 7.8 percent in 1977; depre-
ciation on these fixed assets had been increasing faster.
Accumulated depreciation increased 8.5 percent in 1973 but
increased by 10.1 percent in 1977.
The most erratic trend was in the sales to net
working capital ratio. Although B&W's figures were higher
than the industry standards of 5.2 times, in 1974 and 1977
there were substantial declines. During these two years B&W
sales increased 20 and 11 percent respectively. In 1974
sales were up even though it was a year in which price controls
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were in effect for a number of months, inflation drove up
costs, interest rates rose, and material and fuel shortages
were widespread. However, the ratio decreased due to the
large increase in new working capital. The 1974 net increase
in working capital was $143.5 million, while in years 1973,
1975 and 1976 there was actually a decrease. The major
reason for the increase was due to conversion of current
notes to noncurrent in the sum of $155 million.
In 1977, sales rose 11 percent, up to $1,877
billion, and at the same time net income reached a record
high of $61.8 million, and increase of 16 percent from 1976.
The record increases resulted from improved performance in
B&W's operating division, primarily in steam generating and
associated equipment. However, the increased net income and
also the additional noncurrent obligation, namely an 8-1/2
percent note totalling $60 million, caused the net working
capital to increase faster than sales, thus the dip in the
ratio.
In viewing McDermott's trends, it is apparent
that their total asset committment towards each sales dollar
hasn't changed substantially since 1973. At the same time
two of the trends, involving fixed assets and net working
capital are showing unfavorable signs. McDermott's sales
to fixed assets trend has been increasing from 1973 to 1977.
One explanation for this trend is that the company isn't
83

turning over the fixed assets as fast as they should. It
would appear that they currently have an aversion to invest-
ing in new plants and equipment, due to a lack of incentive
within their depressed market.
Another area showing unfavorable signs is sales
to net working capital. The overall trend since 1973 has
been decreasing, although slightly. It appears that the
company cannot favorably turn its working capital into sales
.
Contributing factors to the increase in working capital are
principally the addition of B&W contracts in progress, total-
ling over $320 million in both 1978 and 1979; and B&W's
addition of its inventories. Although the working capital
has been increasing, sales revenues have not increased in
the same proportion. The primary reason for reduced sales
in the marine construction services business is the increases
in oil prices and overall insecurity about the OPEC nations
and the Middle East in general. Because of this insecurity
there should be an increase in the market for offshore con-
struction. If this happens, McDermott's marine construction
services business should become healthier. This in turn
should reverse their financial trends for the better.
6 . Return on Investment
The last area of analysis deals with the company's
profitability picture, specifically its ability, to distribute
a profitable return to the investors. The two ratios con-
cerned with in this area are return on equity and return on
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As both the ratios show, B&W's investment return
picture is profitable. Its trends are increasing steadily
with no fluctuations and comparable to industry norms. In
either case, it appears that the investors are gaining a
favorable return from B&W for their investment, and that the
future tread appears to be the same, if not better.
In the case of both ratios, the reason for the
increase was due to rapidly rising net income for the com-
pany, faster than either its total assets or investment by
the owners have increased. Record sales revenues in both
the steam generating and tubular products divisions, along
with lower interest expense payments resulted in greater net
income. The significant decrease in the interest expense
resulted from a combination of substantially reduced average
total debt levels and also lower interest rates. This was
particularly true in the years 1976 and 1977.
This most favorable profitability picture is one
of the contributing factors which interested both United
Technologies and McDermott in the acquisition of B&W
.
Both McDermott' s ratios show marked declines
since 1976-1977, due entirely to the decline in net income.
These ratios show that McDermott' s investors are not in as
comfortable a position as they were prior to 1976. The
foreign oil market which led to reduced sales and revenues
decreased McDermott 's net income to a level lower than it
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financial picture, the company still is at a crossroad in its
corporate life. What McDermott attempted was to diversify
into various areas involving the energy field. With the
addition of B&W's coal and nuclear power businesses, McDermott
will be able to expand into whichever energy field that will
provide the resources for the energy needs of tomorrow.
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
With respect to short-term liquidity, B&W-s trends have
been fairly consistent, while McDermott* s have not. While
McDermott' s trends have fluctuated they appear close to
industry norms, while B&W's appear lower. This latter trend
may show a less than desirable safety margin to cover current
liabilities for B&W.
While B&W's profit picture was impressive from 1973 to
1977, McDermott 's have taken a dramatic downturn since 1977.
This decline was due to reduced sales revenues from McDermott'
s
marine construction services business.
Both companies' long-term solvency trends, although
fluctuating, appear sound.
From a "market value" standpoint, as of the time of the
merger B&W seemed very marketable, while McDermott did not.
McDermott 's earnings per share have decreased since 1977 due
to their reduced sales and decline in new income. In both
trends McDermott 's figures have not been comparable to the
industry norm, for the years 1975 to 1979.
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With respect to asset utilization, neither B&W nor
McDermott' s total asset committment seems to have changed
much since 1973. B&W s trends have been increasing, with
minor fluctuations. Conversely, McDermott's trends involving
fixed assets and net working capital are showing unfavorable
signs.
The final area, return on investment, depicts why B&W
became an acquisition prize, and McDermott an acquirer. B&W's
favorable profitability picture was due to rapidly rising
sales and net income. Both its ratios were increasing, and
comparable to industry norms. McDermott, however, was not
showing a favorable profit picture, due to reduced sales in




The merger on March 31, 1978 between Babcock & Wilcox,
Co. (B&W) and J. Ray McDermott & Co. , Inc. (McDermott) was
not a simple takeover. A major player in the bidding war
for B&W was United Technologies Corporation (U.T.C.).
This chapter discusses the aspects of the merger. It
commences with a look at U.T.C. in general and why they
attempted to takeover B&W. It then addresses the merger
itself, the legal battles associated with it, and the finan-
cial aspects. It concludes with a proforma look at the
combined companies and the benefits of the merger.
A. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION
1. General
U.T.C. is a Connecticut-based conglomerate that
designs, builds and sells a variety of high technology
products for industrial, commercial and government customers
worldwide. U.T.C. comprises nine major operating organiza-
tions and a large research center. Its products are grouped
into three different categories: power systems, flight
systems and industrial products and services.
Within the power systems division, which is organized
into two groups
—
gas turbine and fuel cell operations
—
products include aircraft engines, industrial gas turbines,
rocket motors, engines and boosters.
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The flight systems division is involved with aeronau-
tical and space systems and equipment, commercial and military
helicopters.
The industrial products and services divisions
manufacture air conditioning and energy process equipment,
elevators and escalators; automotive products and systems;
conductors, controls and devices for the transmission and
application of electricity; automotive and industrial diag-
58
nostic and test systems, and scientific instrumentation.
Major companies that have been acquired by U.T.C.,
and which comprise a large percentage of their sales reve-
nues, are Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, manufacturers and design-
ers of commercial and military aircraft engines; Otis
Elevator Company, manufacturers of elevators and escalators;
Essex Incorporated, manufacturers of electrical, electro-
mechanical and electronic products; Norden Systems, who
design, develop and manufacture highly advanced electronic
systems for use in aricraft, space vehicles and submarines;
Sikorsky Aircraft, an international leader in the design
of helicopters; and Carrier Corporation, a leader in the
production of air conditioning and related products.
2. Financial
In calendar year 1979, U.T.C.'s sales reached
$9,053,358,000, of which 23 percent was from contracts
with the United States government. This sales total was an
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increase of 133 percent since 1975. During these same five
years, reliance on government contracts declined from 33
percent to the 1979 figure.
Other key figures as of 197 9 were a net income after
taxes of $325 million, total assets of $6.4 billion and an
earnings per share of common stock of $6.49.
3. Corporate Philosophy
U.T.C.'s chairman and chief executive officer,
Harry J. Gray, came to the corporation in 1971. Prior to
this he had risen to the number three spot in Litton Indus-
tries, Inc., namely senior executive vice-president. Prior
to Gray's arrival, U.T.C. was almost exclusively dependent
on the volatile aerospace market, with roughly half of its
sales to the government. It's commercial aircraft engine
market was losing its virtual monopoly to General Electric
Co., and the company's top management, which was highly
inbred, was about to retire.
What Gray wanted was to reduce U.T.C.'s dependence
on government contracts. His way of achieving this was
through corporate takeovers. U.T.C. acquired Essex Inter-
national in 1974, Otis Elevator in 1976, and Carrier Corpora-
tion in 1979. As a result, in 1979, the aerospace division
accounted for only about 4 5 percent of revenues, and govern-
ment work, while increasing 66 percent in dollar volume since





4. Interest in B&W
Gray s philosophy towards corporate takeovers was to
find companies in the $500 million to $1.5 billion sales
range that makes products "technologically compatible" with
U.T.C. 's, command big market shares, and have management
teams that are likely to stay around. He said that he was
interested in acquiring "technically based companies where
our management capabilities and technical, production, and
marketing skills" could be exploited. Areas that Gray iden-
tified as logical growth opportunities included the electron-




As stated previously, U.T.C. was lured to B&W because
of what seemed to be a move toward an increased use of coal
and nuclear power. With B&W being a leading producer of
nuclear-power systems and cuclear fuel, as well as coal-
fired boilers, they were of great interest to Gray. B&W's
chief competitors in the nuclear field are Westinghouse
Electric Corporation and General Electric Company, while
Combustion Engineering Incorporated competes with them in
both nuclear and boiler equipment sales. As many people
close to U.T.C. have stated, Harry Gray wanted to expand
U.T.C. into a second General Electric Company. B&W, although
smaller than Combustion Engineering, was the prize Gray wanted
to win because B&W was "better and Cheaper."
Because of these reasons, in March 1977 U.T.C.
notified the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the
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intention to offer to purchase any and all shares of B&W
common stock for $42 per share, nearly $10 higher than the
the current market value. In the ensuing months U.T.C.
fought a bidding war with McDermott over B&W. It wasn't
until August 25, 1977 that U.T.C. finally dropped out of
the bidding war after McDermott offered $62.50 per share
and agreed to pass the entire $2.50 dividend to the B&W
shareholders. Although U.T.C. still felt that B&W was
worth bidding for, they felt that the range of bidding was
higher than they wanted to go. So ended the acquisition
war of the year, and the subsequent merger between McDermott
and B&W on March 3.0, 1978 resulted.
B. ASPECTS AND LEGAL BATTLES OF THE MERGER
The acquisition war started in February 1977 when the
directors of B&W and U.T.C. met to discuss U.T.C. 's interest
in purchasing B&W. Two days later on February 27, the
Federal Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 became effective.
The act required that advance information in connection with
certain proposed share acquisitions be given to the Anti-




B&W did not make a decision until March 28, when their
directors told U.T.C. that they would not consider the
offer until after President Carter's proposed energy plan
had been issued. This plan called for conversion of existing
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power plants to coal, which would have been beneficial to
B&W. U.T.C. did not wait however, and on the same day made
the initial offer of $42 per share.
During the next week B&W's directors discussed the offer
made by U.T.C. During this time U.T.C. sent the mandatory
report to the SEC describing their offer. On april 4, B&W
said "no" to U.T.C.'s offer and immediately filed a complaint
with the Federal District Court of Northern Ohio alleging
violations by U.T.C. of federal antitrust and state securities
laws. On April 5, U.T.C. filed with the Ohio Division of
Securities notification of their intended takeover bid, under
the Ohio Takeover Bid Statutes.
On April 25, U.T.C. filed its answer in the Ohio Federal
District Court denying the allegations by B&W and countered
with allegations against B&W saying they disseminated false
information to their stockholders to stifle their offer.
They also requested that B&W submit to them a list of their
shareholders.
On April 27, the Governor of New Jersey signed into law
the "New Jersey Corporation Takeover Bid Disclosure Law."
B&W is a New Jersey corporation, and this Act therefore
applies. It requires notification of a takeover bid for
10 percent or more of the outstanding equity shares of a
New Jersey corporation. The chief of the State Bureau of
Securities may within 20 days order a hearing to determine
that the proposed offer will not:
96

(i) jeopardize the financial security of the target
company or prejudice the interests of employees; or
62(ii) be unfair to shareholders.
During the months of April and May, U.T.C. filed with
the New Jersey Bureau of Securities the information it
"believed to be required" in accordance with the aforemen-
tioned disclosure law, and in Arkansas under the "Arkansas
Investor Protection Takeover Act," because over 35 share-
holders were residents of that state.
On June 1st the New Jersey Bureau of Securities decided
that no hearing was necessary under the state's takeover
act.
During these same two months the Federal District Court
of Ohio found U.T.C. 's offer in accordance with its statutes,
New Jersey started hearings, and the Arkansas court delayed
hearings for ten days.
But B&W was not through with their delaying tactics.
The company used nuclear materials and therefore had licenses
for these materials. Under Article 184 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 these licenses may not be transferred without
prior approval of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
.
B&W requested the NRC to forbid U.T.C. to obtain transfer of
these licenses, or submit an application for the transfers.
The NRC denied these requests and thus B&W appealed for a
reversal in the Federal Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C.
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All of B&W s requests were denied and as of June of that
year the position of the licenses was still undecided.
From June 1st to the 13th, the Federal District Courts
of Ohio, New Jersey and Arkansas all decided in favor of
U.T.C. As a result B&W appealed these decisions in each
state.
Then on July 5, the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice brought an action against U.T.C. in
the District Court in Connecticut, alleging that U.T.C. had
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. The effect of an
acquisition by U.T.C. of B&W would be, the Division claimed,
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
63
utility power generating equipment.
On July 15, the Federal District Court of Ohio decided
that U.T.C. had not violated section of the Clayton Act,
article 184 of the Atomic Energy Act or the Securities
Exchange Act. The court also denied U.T.C.'s counter claim
of April 25.
On August 4, U.T.C. increased their offer to $48 a share
This offer expired at 10 AM on August 25. As of August 6,
the battle between U.T.C. and B&W was still undecided.
While these court fights were occurring between U.T.C.
and B&W, McDermott entered the acquisition picture. Between
April 6 and May 13, they purchased, on the New York Stock
Exchange 1,205,600 shares of B&W stock, or about 9.9 percent
of those outstanding. McDermott* s position was that they
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couldn't lose by these purchases. By purchasing these shares
at between $39 to $45, if UTC won the takeover at $48, then
McDermott would stand to make approximately $6 million profit,
The alternative action, which they took, was to bid for B&W
themselves. Ths action pleased the speculators in the
financial world.
As previously stated in Chapter III, McDermott entered
the bidding contest with a bid of $55 a share for 4.3 million
shares. This would have given McDermott 45 percent of B&W's
shares outstanding. From then on the bidding contest between
McDermott and U.T.C. was in motion.
The B&W directors, although they would have desired to
remain an independent company, saw an inevitable takeover and
decided to make the best of it. As a result they decided on
August 14 to accept McDermott' s offer.
For the next ten days McDermott and U.T.C. escalated
their bids, as shown in Chapter III, until on August 24,
just before noon, U.T.C. withdrev; its bid to acquire B&W.
The resulting merger between B&W and McDermott was imple-
mented by the purchase of 4.8 million shares at $62.50,
including the passing along of the $2.50 special dividend
to B&W's shareholders. This equated to 39 percent of B&W
shares outstanding. Added to the 1.2 million shares
McDermott purchased openly on the NYSE, they already held
approximately 4 9 percent of B&W shares.
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In analyzing the U.T.C.-McDermott fight, it appears
that it was U.T.C.'s strategy of inching up its bids that
give McDermott the time it needed to wage an all-out fight.
As stated by John A. Morgan, senior vice-president of Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co. and McDermott' s chief advisor in
its bid for B&W, "If U.T.C. had started at $50 a share
—
something close to a fair price—McDermott would never have
entered the fight." 64
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE MERGER
1. Effective Date of the Merger
At a special meeting of stockholders of B&W held on
March 30, 1978, 10,563,537 shares of B&W common stock were
voted in favor of the merger and 85,791 shares were voted
against. These "in favor" shares exceeded the minimum 8
percent of total shares required to approve the merger. On
the same day in a special stockholders meeting of McDermott,
24,824,585 shares were voted in favor of the merger, while
271,241 shares were voted in opposition. Again this exceeded
the minimum requirement for the merger to become effective.
As a result of this approved vote by the stockholders
of both companies and also the filing of certificates of
merger in the offices of the Secretaries of State of New
Jersey and Delaware, the merger became effective on March 31,
1978. At that time the separate existence of B&W ceased and
B&W merged into McDermott Energy, Inc., a Delaware corporation
6 6
and newly- formed, wholly-owned subsidiary of McDermott.
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2. Conversion and Exchange of Shares
As of March 31, 1978, the effective date of the
merger, all outstanding shares of B&W common stock, other
than those already owned by McDermott, were converted into
one share of $2.20 Convertible Preferred Stock and one share
of $2.50 Preferred Stock. In addition, any B&W stock options
still outstanding became options to purchase two shares of
McDermott Common Stock at the same price.
3. Regulatory Approvals
There were three basic approvals required prior to
the consummation of the merger between McDermott and B&W.
First, the Foreign Investment Review Act of Canada (FIRA)
requires that notice of acquisition of "control" of B&W's
Canadian subsidiaries by McDermott be furnished to the
Canadian Foreign Investment Review Agency and that such an
acquisition be reviewed by the Minister of Industry, Trade
and Commerce and approved by the Governor in Council of
Canada as being or likely to be "of significant benefit to
67Canada." On January 26, 1978 McDermott did file, in
accordance with FIRA, and on February 8, 1978 was approved
by the Federal Investment Review Agency.
Secondly, on January 20, 1978 McDermott filed with
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning the transfer of
B&W's nuclear licenses, and on February 6, 1978 approval
was granted for these transfers.
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Finally, the last consideration was that of antitrust
approval by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)
.
Both B&W and McDermott filed required
reports with the FTC, at the request of the Justice Depart-
ment, and were given approvals.
With these approvals obtained McDermott was able to go
ahead with the consummation of the merger with B&W, effective
March 31, 1978.
4 . Reorganization and Management
As one of the agreements of the merger, five of B&W's
present directors, Messrs. Zipf, Baker, Wearly, Cantwell, and
Shaw became directors of McDermott. B&W's business was to
be carried on under substantially the same operating manage-
ment as a subsidiary of McDermott and the officers of B&W
would become officers of the McDermott subsidiary. In addi-
tion, Mr. George G. Zipf, who was Chairman and President of
B&W, would also become Vice Chairman of McDermott. However,
as will be discussed in the next chapter, B&W's management
was changed substantially as an indirect result of the merger
and the movement of B&W's corporate offices from New York
City to New Orleans, Louisiana.
D. BENEFITS OF MERGER AND FINANCIAL OUTLOOK
As described in Chapters IV and V, the benefits that
McDermott hoped to attain from the B&W merger were obvious.
Flush with cash, McDermott needed to diversify in time to
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soften the blow from cyclical decline in its offshore oil
construction businesses and in order to fend off takeover
possibilities. On the other hand, B&W looked at McDermott
as a better "corporate parent" than U.T.C. Whether or not
these goals have been achieved will be discussed in the
succeeding chapter.
Another aspect that McDermott looked at in trying to
acquire B&W was the latter * s sophisticated management.
With B&W's help, McDermott has given more clout and manpower
to its corporate financial and auditing staffs, long-range
planning systems have been installed, reporting procedures
have been refined and standardized, and personnel reviews
68have become more regular and formal. Whereas B&W's
management had always been seen as conservative, McDermott,
in contrast, was seen to be filled with aggressive, free-
wheeling entrepreneurs. This latter philosophy was well
suited to the 1970' s where McDermott experienced very fast
growth. Over the past few years their financial troubles
have called for a management policy more in keeping with
B&W's.
In looking at the combination of B&W and McDermott,
McDermott was looking for help to save their business,
especially the marine construction services division.
Exhibits VI-1 and VI-2 are proforma statements that show
the combination of the two companies financial statements as
of March 31 and September 30, 1977.
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In general, therefore, whether the acquisition of B&W
was successful in achieving its objectives has to be looked
at closely. Tied to this analysis is the Three Mile Island
nuclear accident and the impact it had on the nuclear power
field of B&W. The price-fixing convictions of McDermott '
s
top management also must be looked at. As is seen since the
merger, the businesses of both McDermott and B&W have declined,
at least for awhile. As a result, the management expertise of
B&W is sorely needed by McDermott.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The author has shown that U.T.C. wanted to acquire B&W
because of B&W's reputation within their industry. The
subsequent bidding war with McDermott raised B&W's stock to
83.8 percent of its then market value. To stall a merger
attempt B&W used various legal defenses, but eventually was
acquired by McDermott. The merger was consummated on 31
March 1978 by the conversion and exchange of all outstanding
shares of B&W common stock. Whether or not the merger was
successful from either companies 1 standpoint will be analyzed
in the succeeding chapter.
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LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current Liabilities:
Notes Payable $ 6 , 324
Accounts Payable and Accrued 166,705
Expenses
Provision for Warranty Expense
Accrued Taxes on Income 127 , 495
Dividends Payable 6 , 298
Billings in Excess of Related Costs.
.
.
and Advance Payments » 170,518
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 477,340
Deferred Income Taxes 62,834
Long Term Debt 439,567
Other Liabilities and Reserves 40, 350
TOTAL LIABILITIES 1,020,091
Stockholders' Equity:
McDermott Common Stock; Par Value 51.00 31,806
McDermott Cumulative Convertible Pref.
Series A $2.20, Redempt Value $31.25...
McDermott Cumulative Preffered Series B
$2.50, Redemption Value $31.25
B&W Common Stock; Par Value $4.50




Treasury Stock (2 , 564)
Unamortized Def Exec. Stk Plan Expense. .. (7,711 )
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY... 776,657
TOTAL STK EQUITY S LIABILITIES $ 1,796,748





224,200 (54,000) (11) 405,695












~ (200,292) (2) 200,292
__ (200,292) (3) 200,292
56,700 56,700 (14) —
32,700 32,700 (15) 121,662
338,000 338,000 (16) 633,464
427,400 26,816 1 ,187,516






$ 1,289,300 $(48,918) ,135,466
Exhibit VI-1
Source: Joint Proxy Statement for Special Meetings of Stock-




NOTES TO PRO FORMA COMBINED BALANCE SHEET:
(unaudited)
(A) The pro forma combined balance sheet assumes that the Merger occurred
on September 30, 1977 and BSW's assets and liabilities were recorded at estimated
fair values in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
(B) The McDermott Common Stock has been adjusted to reflect the effect
of the two-for-one stock split of December 15,1977.
(C) The pro forma adjustments assume each outstanding BSW Common Share,
other than BSW Common Shares owned by McDermott, will be exchanged for one share
of $2.20 Convertible Preferred Stock and one share of 52.50 Preferred Stock and
all BSW Common Shares will be cancelled in the merger
.
For purposes of determining cost in this pro forma presentation, each share
of McDermott Preferred Stock to be issued under the terms of the Merger has been
assigned a value of $31.25.
(D) The following is a summary of the adjustments required to reflect the




Investments in BSW (In thousands)
1. Eliminate existing investment in B&W $ (351,556)
2. To reflect issuance of $2.20 Convertible Preferred Stock (200,292)
3. To reflect issuance of $2.50 Preferred Stock (200,292)
$ (752,14oT
Net Adjustments Resulting from Purchase
4. To adjust values of BSW property, plant and eqpt. to estimated fair
value based upon replacement cost information $ 104 , 000
5. To record estimated fair value of patents of BSW 12,000
6. To eliminate intercompany dividends receivable and payable 3,466
(3,466)
7. Costs in excess of equity in net assets of BSW 288,548
8
.
To accrue estimated additional direct merger costs (6 , 000
)
9. To record the actuarially computed value of vested benefits in excess of
the total of BSW s pension funds and balance sheet accruals, net of tax.. (38,000)
10. To eliminate non-current deferred income taxes applicable to BSW's
property, plant and equipment 27,000
11. To eliminate current deferred income taxes and establish tax liability
at current rates for difference between book and tax basis of BSW's
inventories and warranty reserve (54,000)
12. To eliminate goodwill of acquired companies on BSW's fin. statements.... (3,000)
13. To record assumed exercise of BSW's exercisable stock options 2 ,392
332,940
Elimination of BSW's Equity Accounts
14
.
Common Stock 56 , 700
15. Capital in Excess of par value 32,700
16 Retained Earnings 338, 000
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Notes to Proforma Combined Statement of Earnings
(Unaudited)
The proforma combined statement of earnings gives effect to the following
adhustments
:
(1) to amortize over forty years the costs in excess of equity in net
assets of B&W.
(2) to adjust pension cost due to amortization over fifteen years of
accrual of B&W's actuarially computed value of vested benefits in excess of
the total of B&W's pension funds and balance sheet accruals.
(3) to adjust interest expense ( income ) to reflect the cost less related
tax effect of the financing at an assumed interest rate equal to the average
minimum commercial lending rate for the respective periods of the acquisition
of the BSW Common Shares for cash, assuming such acquisition was made at the
beginning of the respective periods.
(4) to record additional depreciation on write-up of B&W's plant and
equipment based on the estimated remaining life thereof, which is assumed for
this purpose to be twelve years.
(5) to record amortization of patents, trademarks and licenses valuation
principally over seven years.
(6) to record the write up to fair value of inventory as a charge
against income within each period.
(7) to record preferred dividends.
(8) to eliminate recorded equity in income of B&W.
(9) the impact of BBR's loses reflected in B&W's Income Before Taxes
and Net Income for the year ended December 31, 1976 and the six month periods
ended September 30, 1977 (including foreign exchange transaction losses) was
$20,300,000 and $12,900,000, respectively.
(10) in calculating the pro forma earnings per share, the weighted
average number of shares outstanding has been adjusted to assume that B&W
stock options exercisable prior to the effective date of the merger have been
exercised, and the balance of the outstanding B&W stock options have been
treated as common stock equivalents.
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VII. POST MERGER APPRAISAL
A. GENERAL
The question of whether or not the March 31, 197 8 merger
between Babcock & Wilcox Co. (B&W) and J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
Inc. (McDermott) was successful is a highly debatable one. While
some corporate strategists have said that it was a blunder,
McDermott emphatically states that the merger looked good in
197 8, and looks even better in 19 80. As was reported to
McDermott' s stockholders in their 1980 annual report, "The
combination of our two companies has made a bigger and better
corporation than either alone ever could have become. It
balanced our business cycles. It increased our capacity to
penetrate the international market. And it broadened our base
69
to include all major forms of energy services."
As has been shown, McDermott' s basic business in the
marine construction services has slipped. This decline on
the offshore construction business is industry-wide. While
McDermott 's decline was substantial, it was less than com-
panies like Brown & Root, Inc. , a Houston subsidiary of
Halliburton Company. Brown & Root actually fold up their
offshore business in times like this, and then restart again
when the economy improves. In this respect, McDermott was
able to pick up some of this business lost by smaller firms
such as Brown & Root.
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In looking at the pros and cons of the merger, it appears
that from McDermott's point of view the merger was successful.
Their two main goals for the acquisition were to (1) diversify
to lessen the blow of their declining marine construction
business and (2) avoid becoming an acquisition target them-
selves. McDermott has achieved both. B&W contributed a
large amount of cash to the corporation. B&W's power genera-
tion systems contributed 44 percent of the company's fiscal
1980 revenues and was solely responsible for keeping McDer-
mott's "head above water." The introduction of B&W's sophis-
ticated management system and the realignment of management
responsibilities throughout the company has helped make the
divisions more manageable and minimized the reporting chains
of command.
For B&W the author feels that it appears to be just a
matter of who would make the better "corporate parent."
With a takeover of the company inevitable, B&W felt that
McDermott was better than United Technologies Corporation
(U.T.C.)
.
The merger is, however, not without some drawbacks. The
three most significant ones are Three Mile Island (TMI) and
its impact on B&W's nuclear power business, the price-
fixing scandal that rocked McDermott's top managment struc-
ture, and finally the typical "house cleaning" that goes
with any large corporate takeover. The next sections will
address these points in more detail.
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B. EFFECTS OF THREE MILE ISLAND
Probably the biggest question mark in the author ' s view-
point is what effect T.M.I, had or will have on B&W, the
nuclear power industry as a whole and the world's economy.
With respect to B&W's business, although they had decreased
their reliance on nuclear energy, T.M.I, has poisoned the
public ' s opinion on nuclear generation of electricity to the
point that any re-emphasis in this field by B&W in the future
will be greatly hampered.
1. The Accident
At about 4:00 AM on March 28, 197 9, Unit 2 at the
Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station, near Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, experienced a turbine trip and lose of coolant
to the reactor. What followed was a near "core meltdown" as
a result of the nuclear core becoming exposed. Basically,
this acident was the result of a combination of mechanical
and human errors and design deficiences in the system.
On April 5, 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) released a report which identified six problem causes
which contributed to the nuclear accident:
1. At the time of the initiating event, there was
loss of feedwater, with both of the auxiliary
feedwater trains valved out-of-service.
2. The pressurizer electromatic relief valve, which
opened during the initial pressure surge, failed
to close when the pressure decreased below the
actuation level.
3. Following rapid depressurization of the pressurizer,
the pressurizer level indication may have lead to
erroneous inferences of high level in the Reactor
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Coolant System (RCS) . The pressurizer level
indication apparently led the operators to
prematurely terminate High Pressure Injection
(HPI) flow, even though substantial voids existed
in the RCS.
4. Because the containment does not isolate on HPI
initiation, the highly radioactive water from the
relief valve discharge was pumped out of the con-
tainment by the automatic initiation of a transfer
pump. The water entered the radioactive waste-
treatment system in the auxiliary building, where
some of it overflowed to the floor. Outgassing
from the water and discharge through the auxiliary
building ventilation system and filters was the
principal source of the off-site release of
radioactive noble gases.
5. Subsequently the HPI system was intermittently
operated in an attempt to control primary coolant
inventory losses through the electromatic relief
valve, which were apparently based on the pressur-
izer level indication. Owing to the presence of
steam or noncondensable voids elsewhere in the RCS,
this led to a further reduction in primary coolant
inventory.
6. Tripping of RC pumps during the course of the
transient, to protect against pump damage due to
pump vibration, led to fuel damage since voids in
the RCS prevented natural circulation. °
There was radiation leakage from the accident, but
no one was, or has since been, injured or killed as a result.
The radiation, primarily due to xenon 133 and krypton 85,
escaped via contaminated water that was being pumped, rather
than by a direct leak in the containment. The loss of coolant
was sufficient to expose the top of the core and resulted in
not only damage to the core, but also to the development of
the hydrogen bubble that was the greatest concern. Finally,
a later release was caused by the venting of gas pressure
71built up in the cooling water system.
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One problem that resulted from the accident was the
media involvement which led to a public uproar over the
already tender subject of nuclear energy. So much informa-
tion was released from the accident site that the media had
no chance to sort out fact from fiction. The almost simul-
taneous release of the film "The China Syndrome" did not
help matters either. The result was a "disaster" that was
blown out of proportion. As was stated during the United
States NRC's inquiry, "had a meltdown occurred, the radio-
activity would probably have been contained by the reactor
building." 72
What can be concluded from the accident concerning
public opinion is that both sides can reaffirm their beliefs,
"On the one hand, the claim that nuclear power is relatively
safe had been dented but not destroyed. On the other hand,
such a catalogue of negligence in the United States nuclear
establishment had been exposed that nobody can remain compla-
73
cent about nuclear safety." The lessons to be learned
are: the dangers of complacency and the need for a better
training program for plant operators. Nuclear rules within
the United States are designed to prevent "single-fault"
accidents. Multiple failures, however, in pieces of equip-
ment that individually are unimportant are not given suffi-
cient attention. The analysis that will come from T.M.I,
will hopefully prevent an identical accident from happening.
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But unless plant designs and construction specifications
are reviewed and updated, a more serious accident may likely
occur.
It took weeks, even months, to find the causes and
discuss ways to clean up the worst nuclear accident in history
But the impact that T.M.I, will have on the economy will be
with us for a lot longer.
2. Impact on the Nuclear Community
Nuclear energy has for a long time been a very sen-
sitive subject. The pros and cons concerning nuclear safety,
disposal of nuclear waste, and radiation leakage have been
critically debated. T.M.I, has added more fuel to an already
heated and controversial question.
Nuclear power had been planned to produce a seventh
of all the energy consumed throughout the world by the year
2000. With additional emphasis now being put on nuclear
safety, the already high cost of going nuclear will go still
higher
.
The nuclear energy field had been slowing for a
number of years prior to T.M.I. Currently the major deter-
rent in establishing nuclear power plants is the twelve year
lead time required to site, license, and build a power plant.
President Carter had proposed legislation to shorten this
time frame by cutting some of the "red tape," but at the
same time not degrading the requirements for approval of
these licenses. Although President Carter still expects to
114

pass this legislation through Congress, the costs of nuclear
energy will continue to rise for one reason because of delays
in approving nuclear projects.
The fight over whether or not nuclear energy should
be expanded or make a shift to coal-fired power plants is
still continuing. While working as either a coal miner or
in the coal-fired power stations can lead to future deaths
due to respiratory problems, the deaths can be greatly re-
duced by the introduction of "gas scrubbers" in the plants,
and added safety precautions in the mines. In contrast,
nuclear power seems to offer a peculiar all-or-nothing type
of danger. The pro-nuclear people are still able to say
that no member of the public has ever been injured or killed
by nuclear power plants. As one energy expert stated,
"....the full effect of the accident on the future of nuclear
power probably won't be clear for months or even years. The
industry has been in a recession anyway, with few new reactors
on order because of a worldwide drop in electricity demand,
74licensing delays and financial problems."
Whatever the outcome from T.M.I. , the cost of pro-
ducing electricity in the future will continue to soar;
whether because of the lengthy delays in the approval of
nuclear plants or of the cost of switching to other fuel
sources if nuclear power is stymied permanently. Whatever
the outcome, especially if President Carter's energy plan
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is ever approved, B&W will stand to gain substantially from
any conversion to coal-fired power plants.
3. Impact on B&W and the Merger
The impact of T.M.I, on B&W has been damaging but
not destroying. The results of various lawsuits based on
the accident appear to be leaning in B&W's favor. The
company was exonerated by the NRC with respect to the build-
ing of the reactor according to design specifications. The
company feels that they will be fully covered against any
claims made from the subsequent lawsuits by the provisions
of the Price-Anderson Act, under which the government will
pick up any costs incurred as a result of a nuclear accident.
With respect to B&W's nuclear power business, T.M.I.
was really the "icing on the cake," not a cause for its
reduction. Because of the energy crises that have occurred
since the early 1970' s energy conservation has been improving.
A result within the utility industry has been a reduction in
their orders for nuclear power plants. Even before T.M.I.
B&W had been trimming its committment towards the nuclear
business, concentrating on federal programs while pulling
back on commercial work. In the spring of 1979 they closed




McDermott management expects that if the utilities
do shift away from nuclear power, that B&W will benefit from
the shift. While B&W claims about 10 percent of the U.S.
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nuclear market they claim about 50 percent of the market in
coal-fired boilers. This latter market is considered the
main alternative to nuclear power due to coal's abundance.
Overall, nuclear business accounts for 15 percent of McDer-
mott 's business, while coal plants account for about 25
percent. A major determinant as to the future direction of
power plants will be President Carter's energy plan, contain-
7 6ing the $10 billion coal conversion program.
In analyzing the impact that T.M.I, had on the merger,
the author feels that it was not as big a detriment as orig-
inally thought. While it certainly will not help B&W's
nuclear business, it appears that they were already lessen-
ing their dependence on nuclear power and concentrating more
on the other areas of their business.
C. McDERMOTT'S PRICE-FIXING SCANDAL
On the eve of the merger between McDermott and B&W, the
former was involved in a Federal grand jury investigation,
in New Orleans, into price-fixing, collusion and antitrust
violations. The investigation had actually been under way
since 1976, and concerned illegal activities by McDermott
and Brown & Root, Inc., dating back to 1968. In the spring
of 1979, the grand jury found four present and former
McDermott executives guilty.
The investigation showed that McDermott and Brown & Root,
Inc. were divvying up offshore projects between them at
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prearranged prices. Such collusion was possible because of
the haitimerlock these two companies had on the offshore
construction trade. Together, the pair built about 75 per-
cent of the large platforms in domestic waters, installed
90 percent of them, and laid 90 percent of the large-diameter
77pipe connecting the platforms to coastline terminals.
Beside these findings were convictions for illegal kick-
backs and political contributions. McDermott personnel were
reimbursed for contributions to politicians in Louisiana.
Over a ten year period the estimated dollar value of these
contributions was approximately $1.1 billion. This marked
the first time that a company of McDermott' s size had been
convicted under the racketeering statutes.
As a result of these convictio'ns McDermott' s management
underwent a major structural change. The four executives
convicted all retired citing personal reasons. In addition
to this, McDermott had been under tremendous pressure from
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) , the Justice Depart-
ment and its outside directors to tighten its controls and
stop the illicit payments. By merging with B&W, McDermott
was able to bring in four new members to its board of direc-
tors, add personnel in the much needed audit department and
institute long-range planning systems. One major change
was that Walter M. Vannoy, former B&W executive vice
president, was named McDermott' s executive vice president
and chief administrative officer, and was tasked with the
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integration of the two compaines. Whereas McDermott never
before utilized long-range planning, the introduction of
"new blood" from B&W caused this type of activity to become
a doctrine for McDermott.
In summary, it would appear that with the primary divi-
sions within McDermott* s business declining the management
know-how of B&W will be sorely needed. The fact that the
price-fixing scandal occurred does not seem to have hurt
McDermott professionally. It would therefore appear that
McDermott benefitted from the merger with B&W due to the
latter s management addition, which was helped along by the
resignation of some key executives as a result of the
indictments.
D. CORPORATE SHAKE-UP
Inherent in any merger involving large corporations is
the shake-up of the corporate management structure. A
review of literature indicates that acquired company's
finance division can be gutted. The financial executives
are the ones who "pull the purse strings," and the acquirer
wants this power.
So was the case with the McDermott-B&W merger. In 1979
McDermott moved B&W's corporate offices from New York City
to their offices in New Orleans. With this change came
numerous firings. A large percentage of B&W employees from
the corporate office were not asked to transfer to
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Louisiana, Other top executives who were given the invitation
to move, opted instead to retire. These executives were the
ones that McDermott wanted in their company. This change of
home office came as an unpleasant surprise to B&W. McDermott
moved the corporate office due to an estimated savings of
approximately $20 million in rental, maintenance and utility
fees and tighter control of B&W.
Another major change involved the organizational structure
of B&W. In March 1980, B&W was restructured into six operat-
ing units. These units are the Business Integration Group,
Materials Group, Fossil Power and Construction Group, Industrial
Products and Services Group, Nuclear Power Group and the
Naval Nuclear Fuel Division. The reasoning was to provide
a more balanced distribution of management responsibilities
78
and a better focus for those responsibilities. Whereas
before the Power Generation Group comprised half of the
companies employees, now no group is larger than one-third.
E. FINANCIAL OUTLOOK
Despite any other disadvantages that can be cited from
the merger, the one sure advantage from McDermott' s stand-
point is that B&W has been the main force in holding the
company's "head above water." Fiscal year 19 80 showed
McDermott with a $137.9 million increase in revenues, but a
decrease in net income of $4.6 million. The main cause for
the drop in net income is still McDermott 's marine construc-
tion services. The marine construction services' revenues
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decreased by $28,778,000 from 1979, as a result of decreases
in domestic operations. McDermott experienced an operating
loss of $46,737,000 in this segment, compared to an operating
profit of $61,011,000 in 1979. While this segment accounted
for 30 percent of revenues, its percent of operating income
was a negative 30 percent.
Power generation system's revenues decreased by $6,403,000
due primarily to extended strikes at several plants. Despite
the impact of the strike, this group contributed to an in-
crease in operating profit of $25,117,000 from 1979. Thus,
while the power generation systems accounted for 44 percent
of total revenues, it accounted for 93 percent of McDermott '
s
operating income. Exhibits VII-1 and VII-2 show McDermott'
s
fiscal 198 financial statement.
B&W' s engineered materials division also had increased
revenues due to increased shipments of both tubular and
refractory products. While McDermott 's other products and
services divisions had a negative 4 percent operating income,
due principally to an incurred loss of approximately $10.5
million on a domestic operations' project.
In summary it is seen that B&W's addition has greatly
benefitted McDermott 's financial picture. They are account-
ing for nearly all of the company's operating income, due to
McDermott 's trouble in the marine construction business.
McDermott 's cash situation has also improved, up nearly
$20 million, with the addition of B&W's figures.
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Current Assets: of dollars)
Cash $ 38,280
Short-term investments, at cost which
approximates market 485,867
Accounts and notes receivable 725,066
Marketable securities, at cost (market
$40,972,000 in 1980> 13,788
Contracts in progress 361,125
Inventories 422,349
Prepaid expenses 14,889
Total Current Assets 2,061,364
Long-Term Note Receivable - Unconsolidated
Joint Venture Company 29,669
Investments in Joint Venture Companies, at Equity 17,830
Property, Plant and Equipment, at Cost:
Land 36,034
Buildings 204,543
Machinery and equipment 1,222,167
Property under construction 91,030
Less accumulated depreciation and amortization
1,553,774
527,933
Net Property, Plant and Equipment 1,025,841
Excess of Cost Over Fair Value of Net






LITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
1980
(In thousands of dollars)
nt Liabilities:
ies payable to banks and current
laturities of long-term debt $ 29,840
:ounts payable 191,167
-.rued liabilities 357,318
/ance billings on contracts 313,116
ivision for warranty expense 106,903
!. and foreign income taxes 161,087
idends payable 18,923





Agencies and Commitments >




lital in excess of par value 254,521
ained earnings 732,565
— _______ _____
s: Cost of common stock in treasury 2,871
Unamortized deferred career
executive stock plan expense 4,324




J. Ray McDermott & Co.. Inc. and Subsidiaries for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1980




(In thousands of dollars














Equity in earnings of joint venture companies
Other
Retained Earnings, Beginning of Year
Deduct:






Income Before Provision for Income Taxes 153,469









-preferred (Series A, $2.20 and Series B,
$2.60 per share in 1980) 30,296
Retained Earnings, End of Year $ 732,565
Earnings Per Common and Common Equivalent Share:
Primary $ 1.77




In evaluating the impact of B&W's addition from a finan-
cial standpoint it is obvious that without them McDermott
would be in serious trouble. Although fiscal year 198
was overall a disappointing year there seems to be some
bright spots. B&W, even with problems of a depressed boiler
industry and the troubles in the nuclear field resulting
from T.M.I. , still showed a good financial picture. Overall,
although McDermott' s revenues were up only slightly, the
decrease in net income was only a 4 percent drop from 197 9,
compared to decreases of 20 to 4 percent over the preceeding
two years. B&W is shifting its emphasis away from nuclear
steam systems and instead concentrating on coal-fired systems,
nuclear components, and industrial products. McDermott divi-
sions must wait for an increase in the economy and a resurg-
ence in the offshore drilling industry.
In many energy experts view, the marine construction
sector of the offshore drilling industry will soon be on the
verge of an upswing, due to the world's need to look harder
for answers to its energy problems. Add to this the impact
if President Carter's energy bill is passed, and McDermott
could be in fine shape in the near future. In either case,





While many "experts" may consider the merger a blunder
on McDermott's part, it appears that the reverse is true.
Without the merger with B&W, McDermott would surely have
been an acquisition target itself. They were in fact on
Harry Gray's "hit list" of corporations U.T.C. was consider-
ing taking over.
Even though T.M.I, has damaged the reputation of B&W
somewhat in the nuclear power industry, B&W is currently
contributing almost the entire net profit of McDermott.
In analyzing McDermott's objectives in their desire to
merge, it is apparent that they achieved what they were after
B&W's business will continue to keep McDermott solvent until
their marine construction services business can "right
itself," and then the combined businesses should make
McDermott a stronger company than they ever were. Between
their business in oil and natural gas, and B&W's involvement
in nuclear and fossil fuels, McDermott will be involved
extensively in whichever direction the world's economy goes,




VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
Chapter I started with a look at the world economy,
specifically the energy crisis that has existed since 1973.
While oil and natural gas reserves are becoming scarcer, the
energy needs of tomorrow are sure to be filled by coal,
nuclear power and various other sources. Babcock & Wilcox
Co. (B&W) and J. Ray McDermott's (McDermott) businesses are
both concerned with meeting these energy needs. While B&W has
had a good financial picture, McDermott has not, due largely
to reductions in domestic and international operations of
its marine construction services.
Due in part to its financial woes , McDermott merged with
B&W in March 197 8. The author's objectives were to look at
the merger and appraise whether or not it was a good merger
from the two companies' standpoint. A trend analysis of both
companies ' operating performances was accomplished in Chapter
V. In some cases problems have been identified but solutions
to these problems appear outside the scope of this thesis.
Chapter II talked about mergers in general, the various
reasons companies merge, and why some mergers eventually
fail. The legal implications, involving antitrust suits and
restraint of trade , that companies must face when considering
a merger were also presented.
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The merger between B&W and McDermott, along with the
bidding war between McDermott and U.T.C. was discussed in
Chapters III and VI. U.T.C. wanted to acquire B&W because
of their reputation within their industry; but lost out to
McDermott after a bidding war that saw the final price of
B&W go 83.8 percent higher than its market value. The
various legal obstacles, discussed in Chapter II, were used
by B&W to try to stall the acquisition attempts of both U.T.C.
and McDermott.
In Chapter VII the author attempted to appraise the mer-
ger from both companies ' viewpoints . McDermott viewed the
merger as successful because it accomplished their objectives
and will allow the company to remain solvent until their
business can reverse its downward trend. Also appraised were
the effects of TMI, McDermott' s price-fixing scandal and B&W's
corporate shakeup. Even with these problems McDermott still
felt that the B&W acquisition was a good one. B&W accounted
for 93 percent of McDermott' s 19 80 operating income, and was
the one "bright light" of McDermott' s otherwise disappointing
operating year. The author concurs that the merger was
successful from McDermott 's viewpoint. However, he feels
that because McDermott made unexpected changes to B&W's
corporate structure that the merger may not have been viewed
as favorable from B&W's standpoint. That is that McDermott
is a better corporate parent than U.T.C.
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B&W, although they originally wanted to remain in-
dependent, viewed a merger as inevitable. While they did
not care to be taken over they felt that McDermott would
allow them to operate the company in much the same manner
as before. With U.T.C. as a "corporate parent" the feeling
at B&W was that U.T.C. would not follow this same trend.
The analysis shows, however, that the moving of B&W's cor-
porate offices, the resulting termination of many employees
and the realignment of the organization was not viewed as
favorable by B&W management. From this point, it would
appear that B&W has not been as happy with McDermott as
originally expected.
B. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
1. B&W's new orders by the electric utility industry
are at low levels
New orders for power plants by the utility industry
have been at low levels, due primarily to cost-induced con-
servation and a resultant decline in electricity demand
growth. Additional causes include uncertainties by excessive
government regulation and the lack of a national energy policy
Because B&W deals with utilities their business has
suffered also. Their boiler market is in a depressed state.
Add to this problems in the neclear field as a result of
TMI and B&W should be moving away from these historic
businesses. A reduction in their nuclear power field is
advisable, as is happening. Concentration on coal-fired
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boilers, tubular and industrial products, and engineering
and services should therefore be the greatest concern of B&W.
Especially worthy of note is the "bonanza" that B&W will
receive if President Carters' coal conversion program is
made into law.
2. B&W's fixed asset utilization is showing an unfavorable
trend
This trend has been steadily increasing, which shows
a problem with fixed asset productivity. Accumulated de-
preciation is increasing faster than plant, property and
equipment. This shows a current aversion to investing in
new plants and equipment, due to a lack of incentive within
their depressed market. A review of plants and equipment
that are not being utilized profitabily should be accomplish-
ed, especially in areas where the business is being reduced
as in the nuclear field. The closing of the Mt. Vernon,
Indiana plant is a good step in this direction.
3. Substantial changes in management have resulted from
the merger ~~~~ ~ *
These changes have resulted from the termination of
B&W employees associated with the shift of the corporate
office, the price-fixing scandal involving McDermott's top
management, and the normal "house cleaning" that results
from any large corporate merger. The biggest change came
within the board of directors. Of the five B&W directors
who became members of McDermott's board as specified by the
merger terms, only two remain. The other three have retired
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for various personal reasons, and have been replaced by
McDermott personnel. Changes at lower levels of management
have occurred because of the revamping of the organizational
structure. The author is certain that changes of this
magnitude were not expected when B&W was considering McDermott
as a parent company. In the author's opinion these changes
appear to have altered B&W's views on the success of the
merger.
4. McDermott 's offshore construction business is in
a depressed state due to reduced sales from domestic
and international operations
Because of the reductions in international sales due
to foreign government intervention, and attempts to control
the supply of oil and natural gas in general; McDermott'
s
marine construction services have taken a severe downward
turn over the last few years. Oil is becoming harder and
more expensive to find and extract. Quadrupled energy prices
have caused some conservation, thus demand is lessened.
Because of the higher prices, supply of oil is encouraged.
The result is a temporary glut. It is therfore not econom-
ical to drill for more oil in the short run. This has caused
the reduction in McDermott 's sales revenues. If not for
B&W's contribution McDermott would be in dire straits
financially. As many energy experts have predicted, because
the world will be continuing to search for answers to their
energy problems, the offshore construction industry should
start to turn upward. This will benefit McDermott in two ways,
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One, by the mere fact that they are a leader in the con-
struction of offshore drilling platforms, and they will
benefit if offshore drilling increases over the next decades.
The second reason is that more than 90 percent of the areas
favorable to oil and gas recovery lie at water depths ex-
ceeding 1000 feet. McDermott already has the technology and
equipment to explore for oil at these depths. Thus, if the
offshore industry grows as projected, McDermott will benefit
substantially
.
5. McDermott is still flush with cash even though fiscal
year 1980 was disappointing
While the projections for the future of McDermott and
B&W's businesses are encouraging, right now both companies are
in a depressed state. One factor that needs to be considered
is the possibility of McDermott dipping into its excess cash
and trying to diversify again via another merger. This is
obviously the way that McDermott improved its financial pic-
ture for fiscal years 1979 and 1930. A merger is also the
thing that brought on some of McDermott s current troubles,
e.g. Three Mile Island. While B&W has helped out McDermott
financially, there is the mess that has resulted from TMI
.
In retrospect, however, it would befit McDermott to look at
acquiring a company that could fit nicely into its present
business and help it expand in the future, as B&W will surely
do. The author feels that McDermott should look at a company
in the $500 to $750 million range, that could help alleviate
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some of their financial woes. One drawback, however, is that
presently McDermott's "market value" is not exciting. Their
stock is low, which will probably not be appealing to a
company interested in merging.
C. CONCLUSION
From a financial standpoint B&W is in fine shape, with
some problems dealing with fixed assets. Conversely,
McDermott is having financial troubles with their marine
construction services business.
With these financial troubles in mind, McDermott's view
of the success of the merger is that 3&W's contribution to
the company has kept them solvent. Both of McDermott's
objectives prior to the merger were satisfied by the acqui-
sition of B&W, and even with the troubles involving TMI and
the price-fixing indictments, they still consider the merger
a success. If the offshore drilling industry projections
come to pass, and President Carters' energy program is ever
implemented, J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. will once again be
a strong leader in the energy field.
It appears evident that the merger between B&W and
McDermott was successful from McDermott's point of view.
From B&W's point of view, however, the conclusion is not as
concrete. While a merger was inevitable, McDermott's changes
within B&W's corporate structure appears to have changed 3&W's
mind concerning the success of the merger. With changes
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occurring within B&W's management, the author concludes that






THE BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1973 TO 1977
Income and Retained Earnings
r«n-iear Cmi^'jon |in mouianas ol dollars! For
-r.e Camndar Year 1977
Sales (on percentages completion method lor long-term contracts) $1,877,200
Costs ana expenses except depreciation
1 703 000
Depreciation y ' 37^000
1.740.000
Income trom operations —137 200"
Income from investments 3500
interest expense (14 7001
Income before taxes and minority interests 126 000
U.S. and foreign taxes on income 63 600
62.400
income appitcaole to minority interests /@00)
Net income tor the year 6i~800
Cash dividends declared 48 100
Remainder, to retained earnings iTToo
Retained earnings at beginning of year 338000
Retained earnings at end ot year $ 351 700
1976 1975 1974 19 7"
$1,691,800 S1. 565.000 $1,277,200 S1.063./00
1.547.800 1,431.700 1,177.200 999,000
32.600 27,700 24.300 21.500
1.580,400 1.459.400 1.202.000 1.020.600
111.400 105.600 75.200 43.100
3,900 1,300 5.800 3.800
(14,800) (23.900) (22.100) (10.200)
100.500 83,000 53.900 36.700
47,200 40.700 24,700 14,500





12.800 9.600 9.700 9.700
40.300 32.700 24.400 12.-100
297.700 265.000 240.600 228.200
S 338.000 $ 297.700 S 255.000 $ 240.600
Changes in Financial Position
Tsn-Vear Comparison (in mousands ot dollars) For lha Calendar Y#«r 1977
WORKING CAPITAL AT BEGINNING OF YEAR $ 137,600
FINANCIAL RESOURCES WERE PROVIOED 8Y:
'
Net income 61,800
Add or (deduct) items not affecting working capital:
Depreciation 37,000
Amount due to subsidiary company by
joint venturer for its share of losses (6.200)
Oeferred income taxes, noncurrent * 4,300
Income applicable to minority interests 600
Equity m undistributed earnings of affiliated companies . . . (400)
Loss on sale of interest in Babcock 4 Wilcox Ltd
Working capital provided by operations for the period 97,100
Fair market value of common stock issued
for purchase ol minority interests in subsidiary
Additional noncurrent borrowings 66,600
Proceeds on sale of interest in Babcock & Wilcox Lid
Conversion of current debt to noncurrent
Exercise of stock options 3,900
1677600
FINANCIAL RESOURCES WERE USED FOR:
Additions to property, plant and equipment 61 ,700
Cash dividends declared 48,100
Reductions of noncurrent indebtedness 12,100
Purchase of interest in Babcock & Wilcox Ltd
Purchases ol and other changes in minority interests
Purchase of treasury stock
Reclassification of amount due to subsidiary company
by joint venturer for its share of prior years' losses
Other, net 3.000
124,900
NET INCREASE (DECREASE) IN WORKING CAPITAL 42,700
WORKING CAPITAL AT END OF YEAR $ 180,300
1976 1975 1974 1973
$ 220.300 S 278.000 S 134,500 $ 151.300
53.100 42.300 34.100 22.100


















62.000 69.700 61,600 36.800
12.800 9,600 9,700 9.700





3.400 (3.700) 2.500 (1.8001
190.000 171.700 75.500 73,600
(82.700) (57.700) 143.500 (16800i




fen-raif Conipji.sor i.n inousanas ol aonarsi AiOocemcerJi 1977 1976
ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash $ 63,300 $ 30.500
Marketable securities 80,300 39.700
Accounts receivable 233.100 171.300
Unbilled sales 215,700 1 76.600
Inventories 287,100 310.600
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 879,500 728.700
INVESTMENTS 9,000 8.400
PROPERTY. PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 379,900 359.200
PREPAID EXPENSES AND OTHER ASSETS 41,300 27.800
TOTAL ASSETS SI ,309,700 $1 ,124.100
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Notes payaole $ 33,800 S 8,200
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities 349,900 325,900
Provision for warranty expense 71,300 69,100
Cash dividends payable 4,600 3,600
U.S. and foreign income taxes 239,600 184.300
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 699.200 591.100
NONCURRENT INDEBTEDNESS 147,400 92,900
DEFERRED INCOME TAXES 26.800 22.500
MINORITY INTERESTS IN SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 3,100 2.000
TOTAL LIABILITIES 876,500 708.500
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
Preferred stock autnonzed and unissued
Common stock including capital surplus 89,500 88,500
Retained earnings 351,700 338.000
441,200 426.500
Less: Treasury stock, at cost 8.000 10.900
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY 433,200 415.600
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS - EQUITY SI ,309.700 SI, 124,100
1975 1974 1973




























































Property, Plant and Equipment
Tan-Year Comoanson (in tnousands ol dollars) For me Calendar Year 1977 1976
COST
At beginning of year $ 668,300 S 617,700
Additions 61 ^00 62000
Initial consolidation of subsidiaries
Retired or sold during year (9,900) (11,400 )
Arend of year 720,100 668.300
ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION
At beginning of year 309.100 285^°0
Charged to operations during year 37,000 32.600
Other additions 2 -300
Retired or sold during year (8.200 ) (WfOO)
At end of year 340.200 309.100



































J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO. , INC., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1973 TO 1979
J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. and Subsidiaries
Ten Year Summary of Operations
In Thousands of Dollars Except Shares and Per Share Amounts

















Income before provision for income taxes





Income before extraordinary items and
cumulative effect of accounting change
Extraordinary items ( net of [axes on income)
Cumulative effect of accounting change
(net of taxes on income)
92,957 159,092
Net income 92.957 159.092
Earnings per common and common equivalent share:
Primary earnings:
Before extraordinary items and cumulative
effect of accounting change
Extraordinary items (net of taxes on income)
Cumulative effect of accounting change
(net of taxes on income)
1.94 5.02
Net income 1.94 5.02
Fully diluted earnings:
Before extraordinary items and cumulative
effect of accounting change
Extraordinary items (net of taxes on income)
Cumulative effect of accounting change
(net of taxes on income) -
1.92 -»92
Net income 1.92 492
Cash dividends:
Per common share
Cash dividends paid on common stock

























Weighted average number of common shares outstanding 32,366.019 31,670,923 31.342,492
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1975 19Tb 1977 1978 1979










1975 197b 1977 1978 1979









1975 1976 197- 1978 19"9








Cash S 3.692.373 S 730,669
Certificates of deposit 31.318.873 28,462.500
Accounts and notes receivable— trade 121.701,222 89.127,853
Other accounts and notes receivable 23.163.684 2,727,694
Marketable securities— at cost (market
1974, 520,206,736; 1973, $17,695,946) 10.349.382 10,349,382
Costs of uncompleted contracts (in excess of related
billings. 1974. 541,287,874; 1973. 512.663.012) 40.989,856 18,122.139
Inventories— merchandise and materials and
supplies at average cost 43.816.765 26.328,811
Prepaid expenses 3.073.116 3,372,442
Deferred income tax benefit 1.070.253 579,856
Total current assets 5279.175.524 5179,801,351
INVESTMENTS, ADVANCES, ETC.;
Long-term notes receivable 5 3.013.554 $ 22,547,779
Investments '. . 6,275,776 3,144,292
Advances, etc 983,798 -1,336,401
Total investments, advances, etc '.'. . S 10,273,128 5 27,028,472
PROPERTY. PLANT AND EQUIPMENT-AT COST 5428.158.008 5355.402,367
Less accumulated depreciation and amortization 149.019,801 124,391,289
Property, plant and equipment— net 5279,138,207 5231,011,078
EXCESS OF COST OVER NET ASSETS OF PURCHASED
BUSINESSES 5 6,252.028 5 6,935,620








Notes payable and current maturities or long-term debt S 43,281.760 $ 32,458.877
Accounts payable and accrued expenses 44 885.271 34.948.429
Dividend payable 2,302.621 1,683.800
Billings on uncompleted contracts (in excess of
related costs. 1974, S90.643.393. 1973 S65.185.746) 52.809.446 24.462.379
Accrued employees pension plan contributions 2.798.269 2,174.427
Accrued interest 2.351,951 1,513,112
Accrued taxes, other than taxes on income 1.737.112 1,624.344
Accrued taxes on income 18.928,270 10,688,097
Total current liabilities SI 69,094. 700 S109.553.465
OTHER LIABILITIES AND RESERVES:
Deferred income taxes S 20.912,169 S 18.304.034
Reserve for self insurance 1,391.428 —
Reserve for supplemental compensation and
other deferred credits 1,461,469 1,265,089
Reserve for roreign operations and drv-docking costs 3.663.382 1.000.000
Total other liabilities and reserves S 27.428.448 S 20,769.123
MINORITY INTERESTS S 39.986 S 20.028
LONG-TERM DEBT S 81.465.540 Sill, 046.608
CAPITAL AND RETAINED EARNINGS:
Common stock, par value $1 per share, authorized
18,000,000 shares; issued 1974, 7.747,105 shares;
1973, 6.806,161 shares S 7.747,105 S 6.806.161
Capital in excess of par value, per accompanying
statement 130,114,926 63.598,593
Retained earnings, per accompanying statement 164,935.594 140.549,690
S302. 797.625 5210,954.444
Less cost of 71,701 shares of common stock in treasury 2.027,699 2,027 699
Total capital and retained earnings 5300,769,926 5208,926,745






Cash s 16,039,784 $ 17.082.122
Certificates of deposit 201 ,355.576 58. 1 59.508
Accounts and notes receivable-trade 262,452,978 220.862.022
Other accounts and notes receivable 23,567,400 24.693. 1 77
Marketable securities — at cost (market
1976. $14,774,919; 1975. $15.019.465) 9,230,876 10.274.977
Costs of uncompleted contracts (in excess
of related billings. 1976. $69,535,804;
1975. S80.533.133) 40,496,454 21 .227 369
Inventories — merchandise and materials
and supplies 74,950,768 90.350.365
Prepaid expenses 5.848.688 2.946.895
Total current assets S 633.942.524 S445. 596.435
INVESTMENTS. ADVANCES. ETC;
Long-term notes receivable $ 387,357 S 388.463
Investments at cost 1,265,597 1.099.433
Investments in affiliated companies at equity 7,789,254 5.297.239
Advances, etc 864.040 952.140
Total investments, advances, etc S 10.306.748 S 7 737 275
PROPERTY. PLANT AND EQUIPMENT - AT COST S 693,974,355 S567.194.898
Less accumulated depreciation and amortization - 228.011.125 . 178,844.769
Property, plant and equipment - net S 465.963.230 S388. 350.1 29
EXCESS OF COST OVER NET ASSETS OF PURCHASED
BUSINESSES S 6.252.028 $ 6.252.028







Notes payable and current maturities of
long-term debt $ 1 0,41 4,741 $ 30. 1 63.095
Accounts payable and accrued expenses 122,132,810 95.794 317
Dividend payable 3.910,925 2.342.210
Billings on uncompleted contracts (in excess of
related costs. 1976. $354,283,710: 1975. S251. 078.404) 152,327,603 96.165.415
Accrued employees pension plan contributions 4,976,711 3.417.462
Accrued interest 6,233,539 5.05 1 .066
Accrued taxes, other than taxes on income 10,892,621 2.961 .350
Deferred income taxes 4,535,837 1 .086.066
Accrued taxes on income 61.309.513 23.714.621
Total current liabilities $ 376.734.300 S260.695.602
OTHER LIABILITIES AND RESERVES:
Deferred income taxes $ 35,774,171 S 22.824.398
Reserve for self insurance 8,052,563 4.660.969
Reserve for supplemental compensation
and other deferred credits 9,852,752 3.305.51
7
Reserve for foreign operations and
dry-docking costs 4.271.413 4.950.834
Total other liabilities and reserves : S 57.950.899 S 35.741,718
MINORITY INTERESTS S 187.674 S 4.217
LONG-TERM DEBT $ 169.399.583 S186.523.337
CAPITAL AND RETAINED EARNINGS:
Common stock, par value S1 per share, authorized
36.000.000 shares: issued 1976. 15.795.530 shares:
1975. 7.881.126 shares $ 15,795,530 S 7.881.126
Capital in excess of par value, per accompanying
statement 134,010,519 140.777.743
Retained earnings, per accompanying statement 376.237.049 231.727.531
S 526,043,098 S380.386.400
(Less):
Cost of common stock in treasury.
(1976, 152.338 shares; 1975. 73.759 shares) (2,400,806) (2.176.490)
Unamortized deferred career executive stock
plan expense (9,968.970 ) (11.672. 727 )









Cash 3 5.231.310 S 16.039.784
Certificates of deposit 469 . 2U6 , 523 201.355.576
Short-term securities at cost which approximates market 59 , 0*±2> .912 —
Accounts and notes receivable - trade 246
. 176 , 325 262.452.978
Other accounts and notes receivable 11 , 475 .515 23.567.400
Marketable equity secunties — at cost (market
1977. S14.276.800: 1976. S14.774.919) 9
, 230 , 876 9.230.376
Costs of uncompleted contracts I in excess of related billings.
1977. S39.131.028: 1976. S69.535.804) 32,250,123 40496.454
Inventories — merchandise and matenals and supplies 50 , 969 . 197 77.003.616
Prepaid expenses 5.789.275 5.848.688
Total current assets .3838.413, 561 5 635.995.372
Investments. Advances. Etc.:
„ „
Long-term notes receivable 9 00 ^ 387.857
Investments at cost 884 , 035 1265.597
Investments in affiliated companies at equity 11 , 912 , 253 7,789,254
Advances, etc 313,657 864.040
Total investments, advances, etc •*> 1> 36o , 516 S 10.306.748
Property. Plant and Equipment - At Cost
'^Zoo ' Iff '
-f \ S 593.974.355
Less accumulated depreciation and amortization ^2o3 , 639 , -^ 228.011.125
Property, plant and equipment - net — ' —-^ S 465,963.230
Excess of Cost Over Net Assets of Purchased Businesses $ 6,252.028 S 6.252.023








Notes payable and current maturities of long-term debt .$ 2
, 328 , 001 5 10.414.741
Accounts payable and accrued expenses 126 , 973 . 132 122.132.310
Dividend payable 6,239,123 3.910.925
Billings on uncompleted contracts (in excess of
,
__ - _ n^
related costs. 1977. 5389.432.339: 1976. 5354.283.710) l 'J • |91 » 3^0 152.327.603
Accrued employees' pension plan contributions J aao 4.976.711
Accrued interest 6 , 059 . 383 6.233.539
Accrued taxes, other than taxes on income 13 > 190 , ^8^ 10.392.621
Deferred income taxes 3
,
322 , 139 4.714.404
.Accrued taxes on income 35,683,355 61.309513
Total current liabilities $425,^68,138 5 376.912.367
Other Liabilities and Reserves:
Deferred income taxes $ 57 1 535 . 639 5 35.774.171
Insurance claims and policy reserves 10 , 037 > o5o 7.076.485
Reserve for supplemental compensation and other deferred credits 17,137,679 9.S52.752
Reserve for drydocking costs 1
, 319 , 3^5 3.271.413
Total other liabilities and reserves $ 88,080,369 5 55.974.821
Minority Interests I 927 r 1U6 5 187.674
Long-Term Debt
-5166,077,676 5 169.259.583
Capital and Retained Earnings:
Common stock, par value 51 per share, authorized 36.000.000 shares:
issued 1977. 15.877.948 shares: 1976. 15.795.530 shares : . * 15,377,948 5 15.795.530
Capital in excess of par value, per accompanying statement ]_j£
( 752 , 103 134.010.519
Retained earnings, per accompanying statement ec-: g-5i 0,27 380.227.408
3706^717373 S 530.033457
'Less):
Cost of common stock in treasury
(1977. 154.978 shares: 1976. 152.338 shares) ( 2 , 516 , 384- ) (2.400.806i
Unamortized deferred career executive stock plan expense (8,512,931) (9.968.970 )
Total capital and retained earnings ,. $695,-^2,013 j =il7fifiTfifll$1,376,005.3^2






Short-term investments, at cost which
approximates market
Accounts and notes receivable
Marketable securities, at cost





(In thousands of dollars)







Total Current Assets 1.936,750 1.831.014
Investments in Affiliated
Companies, at Equity















Net Property. Plant and Equipment 920,744 891.581
Excess of Cost Over Fair Value of Net







LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current Liabilities:
Notes pavabie co banks and current
maturities of long-term debt
Accounts payable
Accrued liabilities
Advance billings on contracts
Provision for warranty expense
U.S. and foreign income taxes
Dividends payable
1979 19?8



























Less: Cost of common stock in treasury





Total Stockholders' Equitv 1.266.662 1.231.439
Total $3,300,942 S3. 182.30"
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J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. and Subsidiaries for the Fiscal Years Ended March 31. 19~9 and 19r8





Selling, general and administrative expenses
1979 1978
(In thousands of dollars




















Income Before Provision for Income Taxes 201,427 240.08-








Net Income 92,957 1 59.092
Retained Earnings, Beginning of Year
Deduct:
684353 553.832
Cash dividends — common ( 51.00 in 1979 and 30.90 in ^"^ per share )




Retained Earnings. End of Year $ 714.883 S 684.353
Earnings Per Common and Common Equivalent Share:
Pnmarv SI.94 S5.02




















Babcock-Brown Boveri Reaktor, GmbH




J. Ray McDermott & Co., Incorporated
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
New York Stock Exchange
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Reactor Coolant System
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